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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
UTAH ClOPPER COMPANY, a
corporation,
Plaintiff arnd Respondent,
vs.
STEPHEN HAYS ESTATE,
INC., a corporation of Utah,
.JULIA HAY'S HOGE, STEPHEN J. HAYS, LAWR,ENCE J. HAYS, MRS. LOU
GORJ;~Y, MRS. ETHEL V.
REILLEY and MARY
LOUISE 0 'DONNELL,
Defendants and Appellants.

Case No. 5302

REPLY BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS
THE ISSUE

Plaintiff is under the strange obsession that plaintiff by a declaration of "plaintiff's purpose" in capturing waters in Tract C has in some way solved the issues
in this case. It makes not one whit of difference what
plaintiff may declare its purpose to be. It may be that
plaintiff has hynotized itself as to the nature of its purpose, but the purpose of law suits and courts is to find
out what the real effect of claims and conduct is and not
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what the declared purpose of one of the litigants i:,;.
Plaintiff's purpose is to capture waters in catchment C.
AH to this there can !be no dispute. If the waters belong
to the defendant, plaintiff admits that plaintiff has no
lawful means hy which plaintiff may be permitted to take
Hw waters in 'l'raet C. Both plaintiff and defPIHlant
elairn these same waters. Piaintiff admits that if the
or·cler of occupancy eutprecl on .June 13, H)'28, and expressly made "without prejudice~" and only "ppnding
the action" had not been Pntered plaintiff could not have
captured these waters in Tract C, not !because plaintiff
\vould have been a trespasser hut bceansc the waters
(those that had been in the dump) would have passecl
from plaintiff's cnvnership when they entered the land
of the clefendm1t. The order is the only new and dderminativc incident in the situation 011 \\'hieh plaintiff rc>lies. Did thl:' onler of June l:J, 1~)28, h~· \Vhich plaintiff
\Yas permitted ''pending the action'' mul ''without pn•jnclice" to enter upon the land of the defell(lant and
c·apture the waters which othenvi:,;e are admittecl to have
belonged to the defendant, chm1ge the owiwrRhip of the
waterR baek to the plaintiff? If it clid, the order waR not
"without prejudice'' but destrueti vc> of defendant's
ovvnership. Plaintiff contend:,; that plaintiff became the
(JWner of the waters ("eoutinued to be owner", plaintiff
phrase:,; it, hut plaintiff cannot eontinue to lw what plaintiff never was-OWNER OF W A'rEH IN 'rRACT C)
hy reason of the order; (lefewlant eontends that such a
resnlt is not possible nuder the statute, but that if it is
possible plaintiff must pay defendant for the copper
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solutions which plaintiff will take. This plaintiff refuses
to do.
Plaintiff has an idea that while Tract C had a
valua'ble water right appurtenant to that tract on .June
12, 1928, the day before the order was entered, that the
valuable water right was lost by some legal hokus-pokus
on .June 13, 1928, by the entry of the order of oc.c•upancy
"pending the action" and "without prejudice". This
law suit is to determine whether the order had the effect
claimed by the plaintiff or was in fact entered, as it expressly provided, "without prejudice" and only "pending the action".
GeHeral Ben Butler is giveu ereclit for having stated
tltnt the law i:,; "that whieh i:,; confidently stated and
;-;toutl.v maiutaiued". Apparently counsel for plaintiff
feel that this is not ouly a good policy 'vith reference to
the la\Y, reg'm·dle:,;:,; of what the cases may hold, but i;-;
partieularly applicable to fact:,;. A reading of respoll(lcnt's 'brief i:,; surprising, to say tht> least, with n)ferencc to some statements therein contained. ·w c will,
therefore, at the outset of this reply, eaii attention of
the court to ·a few statements of counsel before proceedillg to eousi<ler the argument.
WHO OWNS THE FgE OF THE BINGHAM & GARFIELD
RIGHT OF WAY?

On page :3, wherein 'Plaintiff seeks to give this court
a ·statpment of the fads, plaintiff states that almost the
whole of the :,;urface area .between plaintiff's dumps aud
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piaintiff's intake is occupied exclusively by the Bingham
& Garfield Railway Company for railroad purposes
''for the most part upon lm1d whereof plaintiff' is the
owner of the fee, the remainder in part under a decree
of condemnation and in part by conveyance from the
defendants' predecessor in interest". Thi.s is contrary
to the evide1we in the case. The Bingham & Garfield
Raihwt,\' Company owns the land lying between the fee
land of plaintiff and the Valentine Serip property belonging to defendants. Plaintiff mms no land in Dixon
Gulch adjoining the lands of defendants. The intervening land is owned by the Bingham & Garfield R,ailway
Company (Ab. 117), and plaiHtijf has no rig·ht on the
lands of defendants whatsom·er, nor does its property
even adjoin that of defendants. At one stage in the proceedings defendants endeavored to have counsel for
plaintiff concede that the Bingham & Garfield Railway
Company was i11 souw way related to or owned by the
plaintiff, but t lw.v Tcfmwd to admit any rela ti onshi p
whatsoever. ('Jlr. t)l)
DOES PLAINTIFF OWN DEFENDANT'S PROPERTY?

Not m!ly iu the statemeut, hut through the cutin'
brief we find the following phrases used repeatedly:
'"ro plaintiff's intake ou Tract C"; "plnintijj"s intake
on 'l'ract C"; "]Jlai1difJ''s intake was constructed upon
'l'ract C", de. .Just \dwre does plaintiff get the impression that it owns nuy intnkC' upon TraC't C? One
would think from a reading of the stateme11t and the
hrief that this iutaln~ npo11 'Pract C belongs to plaintiff
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awl is upon plaintiff's land. 'l'hi.s intake upon Tract C
is upon the lands and premises of defendant. Plaintiff
O\vns no intake upon Tract C any more than it owns the
waters which are seeping and percolating across and
arise within Tract D. Plaintiff is in this action seeking
the right to aequire 'rract C for the purpose of an intake,
but it certainly owns none at the present time, and any
''intake of plaintiff on Traot C'' is only a figment of
counsel's imagina ti ou.
DOES PLAINTII<'F "EXCLUSIVELY OCCUPY" THE BlNGHAfif &
GARFIELD RAILWAY RIGHT OF WAY?

Plaintiff iu its brief says on page 3 that the railroad right of way "is oceupied exclusively by the Bingham & Garfiel<l Railway Company for its railroad purposes''; and ou page 110 plaintiff says: ''and the
Bingham &: Garfield Railway Company is in the exclusive possession of the premises (Tract D) anyway."
The word "exclusive" is a very positive and comprehensive word and has considerable dynamite in it. If
plaintiff uses this word advisedly, plaiutiff must fol<l
its tent, like the Arab, and as sileutl;' steal away out
of this law suit. If the Railway Company oceupies the
premises exelusively, the defendant has no right of occupancy therein for any purpose, and the plaintiff can
comlenm no rights from the defendant iu this action.
'l 1JC truth is that the Railway Company oceu:pies the
premises for raihvay purposes only aml the defendant
retains the right to use the premises iu all respects uot
iueousisteut with or interfering with the railwa~, com1
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parry's use for railway purposes-including mining·
rights-including the right to collect copper solutions
on and in these prernise·s.

If this is not true, why is

plaintiff attempting to acquire these mining rights, these
rights to eollect eopper solutions in this action from the
defendant~

Plaintiff has not cited a single authority in

its brief in any way qualifying the authorities cited on
pages 55-67 of appellant '·s !brief

upholding~

our bon-

tention that the rail way's occupation is not exclusive,
and that the defendant retains title for all purposes not
inconsistent or interfering with the :milway's use of the
premises for railway purpos0s, including all mining
rights. Certainly the exclusiveness of the railway in its
occupancy of Tract D, if not purely fictional, is impartial in its •suhstantialne.ss and would apply equally
against the plaintiff collecting copper solutions through
condemnation proceedings as against the defendant, the
owner of the fee. And if, on second thought, the plaintiff concludes that plaintiff's claim for the "exclusive
character'' of the railway's occupancy doe.s not make
the purpose of plaintiff's action ridiculous, perhaps the
defendant could collect water out of the toe of the fill on
its own land even though a mining company may not in
the interest of its own mining destroy the rig·ht of
another person to mine in and on its own land.
Certainly if the railway company occupies the railroad right of way "exclusively", the plaintiff could obt.ain nothing from the· defendant in this action.

7
On page 4 of plaintiff's brief plaintiff prodaims its
intention to confine its use of the railroad fill "to the
surface in ih; natural condition" .•Just what virtue there
is in this limitation, if the limitation be true in fact,
plaintiff docs not enlighten tlw court; but eertainly
whatever reality there may be in the limitation, it applies with equal impartialit.v to the defendant's use of
its own propert~· as to the proposed use by plaintiff of
defendant's property, and the virtue, if <any and if true
iu fad, will enure to the owner of the land as muell as
to tlll' a ttemptiug condemnor. Our own idea about the
matter is that there is nothing to the limitation. If the
plaintiff tllay r·ondemn a right to use the railroad right
of wa~c at all, the fact that t-meh usc requires some modifir·ntiou of tlw "snrface in it.s uatural condition", if such
modificatiou does not interfere with the usc by the railroad of tlw t·igl1t of wa.v for railroad purposes, woul(l
not in itselt' alone give the railroad or the defendant thP
right to eomplain. But will the plaintiff use the surface
ot' the right of wa~· o11l.lf in its natural condition?
DOE~

PLAINTIFF INTEND ONLY TO USE THE

"~URFACE"

OJ<'

THE ltAILROAD RIGHT OF WAY IN ITS "NATURAL CONDITION?"

Plaintiff's brief says: ''plaintiff, to preserve its
property in the .solutions mHl the copper they contain,
was eompelled to institute this suit to condemn that
ri ~o·bt'' (the riu:h t to ('OnVe\.' these solutions aeross this
tract though am 1 undl'r the Tail Toad fill) "sub jed to
the railroad eompany's easements, limiting its use to thP
snrfact> iu its natural condition, without any right to
'

(_J

•
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enter or penetrate beneath the surface or to disturb tlte
condition of the surface.'' It is then ~suggested that
Exhibit 11 (Tr. GO) gives to the plaintiff the "use and
occupation of this .surface for that purpose." Plaintiff
may not mean that Exhibit 11 purports to limit plaintiff. Certainly Exhibit 11 attempts to authorize plaintiff to do anything plaintiff wants to do on "any part
or the whole of said 'premises ·~ * * and * * ·~ does
lwreby consent, in ·So far as any rights or easements
owned or poss,essed by it over, upon, in, beneath, or
through the said premises are concerned, that Copper
Company may enter upou and do or cause to be done
any and all acts and things that will not at any time interfere with the proper use and enjoyment of said premises by railroad company.'' The statement of plaintiff
as to the nature of Exhibit 11 is characteristic of pl·aintiff's attitude in a number of matters in this action. On
the trial the efforts of appellant to compel the plaintiff;
in view of plaintiff's assertion that all plaintiff wanted
was a ditch to confine itself to a description of land
resembling something like what a ditch usually looks
like, resulted only in plaintiff saying that what plaintiff wanted was the entire \Vidth of the gulch and height
of the railroad fill, and that the entire guleh constituted
the well-defined eourse of the water from plaintiff's
dump, and that plaintiff must have it all. Now plaintiff says that all it wants is the natural surface of the
ground over which the Bingham & Garfield Railway
Company has its fill. If plaintiff were to be taken at its
own word and the court were to exclude from the plain-
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tiff's rights all waters percolating and seeping or flowing through the railroad fill and above "the surface in
its natural condition", plaintiff would soon change its
tune. What plaintiff \Vants is the right to collect the
copper waters appearing at the toe of Tract D, and
plaintiff will theoretically indicate what its "purpose"
is and how it will use only the "surface in its natural
condition", but would be very much opposed to any
limitation in the decree in accordance with its verbal
protestations, particularly if the eourt were to require
plaintiff to demonstrate that it would make only such
use of ib proposed right-of-way. As a matter of fact,
the wifi:wsscs for plaintiff, all of them, indicated that
the only thing· that is definite and eertain is that the
water reaches rrract D and can be caught in the catchment, Tract C.
APPELLANT CONTESTS PLAINTIFF'S RIGHT TO CONDEMN NOT
ONLY TRACT D BUT TRACTS A, B, C, AND D.

On page 5 is this: "But Tracts B and Care required
for the collection, diversion and conveying away of the
copper solutions in Dixon Gulch the defendants concede
to the plarintifl, so on the proof defendants do not contest
plaintiff's condemna-tion of any of Tracts A, B or C."
Just where does plaintiff get the impression that there
are any solutions in defendants' property in Dixon
Gulch which defendants concede to plaintiff, other than
those which are brought by the pipe line from Carr Fork
and other areas~ So also, where is the proof that de-
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fcndanis do not eo11tcst plai11tiff'H comlenma.tioJJ of
Tract C f We fear that counsel will have considerable
difficulty in pointing to any statement of defendants in
the answer or in their briefs where any such concessions
arc made. On the contrary, defendantH have throughout the trial a11d throughout their briefs maintaine<l ~md
contended for ownership of all waters iu Dixon Gulch
enteriug the lands and premises of defendants other
than in a pipe line, and ecrtainly have resisted to the
utmost of their ability the c·ondemnation of Tract C aml
the capture of the Dixon Guldt waters upou 'l'ract C,
which iH nothing mon~ or lesH than a reduction to possession of defendants' "·aters upon dd'cnd;.mts' own
prenuses. Tract C is the pl<H'P where all waters are
reducl•d to possessio11. ] t iH Hituated upon the land ~md
premise:-; of dcfen<lant:-; Hll(l belongs to defell<lants. How
ean plaintiff sa;· that we do not ('ontest the <•mJdemnation
of Tract C'! ThiH is Hilly iu the extreJIIP.
Appellant <lisputeH tlw right of the plaintiff to condemn 'l'nwts R, C, aml D absolutely and also 'J'rad A
as far as tlw eonderrmation of this tract in any wa.\· interferes with Uw <'oilectioll by appellant of tlw watm·s
in 'l'raet ]) in the catchment in Tract C. rl'he court will
understand tlw Hitnation. 'l'rad C is a catchment in
which is eolleeted all tile waters from rrracts A and D,
induding the <lrai11 tunnel, and rrraet B is a pipe which
('arrics the waters away from rrract C. 'l'here is <·ollccted in rl'ract C through Traet A waterH from Cottouwood Gulch. These waterH are emptied into the eateh-
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ment by a p1pe following the courses of Tract A. In
emptying into the catchment they commingle with waters
which the plaintiff brings from outside the land belonging to the appellant, water which is mingled with the
water in Tract D, and the workings also interfere with
the convenient collection by the appellant of itl:l water
from Tract D. ~~or this reason objection is made to the
condenmatiou of Tracts A and B as far as the tracts are
used to collect the waters into the catchment at C. If
the pipe over 'l'rart B is continued on down the gulch
so that it will not empty its water into the catchment
at C, there will be no objection, hut at the present time
there is, and there always hal:l been, objeetion to this
line to the extent that it interferes with appellant's right
to eolle<"t itt~ own water from Tract D in the catchment,

rrract c.
DID DEFENDANT RELINQUISH CLAIM ON COPPER SOLUTIONS
FROM DRAIN TUNNEL?

In this connection we desire to refer to the drain
tunnel and the pipe leading therefrom. There could be
no objection to the eondenmation of a right to maintain
this pipe from the drain tunnel, except as its waters are
now emptied into the catchment in Tract C and interfere
with the collection of the waters by the appellant in that
tract. \TV e also desire to refer to the statement in plaintiff's brief that the defendants are inconsistent in not
opposing the collection by the phintiff of the water from
the drain tunnel. \Ve see no inconsistency. Appellant
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has made no objection to the collection of these waters
because the drain tunnel leads directly through the railroad fill underneath the plaintiff's dump and conveys the
water from beneath the dump throug·h the fill, and this
water ean at all times be collected and controlled by the
plaintiff on its O\Yll land. It is because of this fad that
appellant has not deemed it worthwhile to contest the
drilin tunnel waters. \Vhile they have not actually been
controlled 011 plaintiff's laud by plaintiff, this can so
readily he dm1e that no point eould be made in compelling
plaintiff to do what it actually ean do, and in addition,
the source of the waters is manifeRt and while they have
up to the pn~Rent been emptied onto the hmd lwlollp;ing
to the appellant, it is 11ot nl'ccssar~' that this continue,
and without doubt plaintiff will, as it easil~· ean, as soon
as plai11tiff finds it is required !:'>O to do, perfeet its titlP
to the waters by controlling aud capturing thorn on its
own land. IH the meantime, as long as plaintiff dumps
them onto the land of the defendant, they belong to defendant.
APPELLANT IS OWNER OF ALL WATERS APPEARING IN
TRACT D FROM WHATEVEH SOURCE THEY COME.

Again, at the bottom of page 5 and top of page 6,
plaintiff would lead the eourt to believe that the on]~,
contention made by defendants was that the waters leaving plaintiff's dump would belong to deft>ndants on]~· in
the eyent they sank into the earth and passed fro111 t1w
property of plaintiff and enten~d thC' premises of <1e-
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fendants in the form of a Rpring from depth. The isRues raised by defendants' answer are fully set forth
at pageR 10, 11 mul 12 of appellants' brief. The subterranean course of the waters was alleged because Ruch a
source would admittedly, if found, have destroyed plaintiff's alleged title in sneh waters, but there won:,; no contention in the answer or in the briefs, or at any other
time or at all, that defendants had title to these waters
only in the el'ent these 'l~·aten.; took a subterrm1ean course.
As a matter of fad, though of course appellant did
not need plaintiff's consent or admission in order to exercise its riglttt-:, every defense made by the appellant
in this case ha.s been admitted by the plaintiff to be, if
it wert• t~stablished, a perfectly good defense. By its
answer appellant alleged the waters in question did not
comt> from the dump. This, if established, is a good
defense. Plaintiff has admitted such to be the case.
Defendant also alleged tlta t. if the waters came from the
dump they sank into the ground ancl appeared in Tract
D only after distant and circuitous route. This was a
good defenHe. Plai11tiff has w admitted it. It ought to
be perfectly apparent \\'ithout plaintiff's admission that
it was neeessary on plaintiff's theory, without regard to
whether that theory was good, bad, or indifferent, that
the waters must come from plaintiff's dump. Any proof
to the eontrary \Voulcl destroy plaintiff's ease at the
Htart. Appellant also pleaded that the title to the waters
ol\ 'rraet D iH in the appellant. 'rhis was a good deft>nse. PIHintiff has admitted it. On the other hand. the
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theory of appellant has never been that if the plaintiff
were to establish that the water's came from plaintiff's
dump, that plaintiff had established title to the waters
on Tract D, or even that plaintiff had established a consummated, final title to the waters while they were in
plaintiff's clump.

AppeUa.nt's position has been, first,

the water did not come from the dump; second, if it
came from the dump it came by distant and circuitous
channel, and title to tl1e water was lost when it left the
dump; third, it makes no difference from where or how
the water comes, even though it were to come in its entirety from the dump and even though it were to come
as a stream in a definite, defined channel, still after it
leaves the dump and leaves plaintiff',s ground plaintiff
loses title, and when the water is collected on defendant's ground it belongs to defendant.

It has always been defendants' position, however,
that as to any part of the waters finally collected on defendants' ground, that if such waters came from plaintiff's dump and did not come by distant and circuitous
route they reached defendants' Tract D after percolating and seeping throug·h plaintiff's dump and through
the gravels and soil beneath the tlump aml through the
fill, the entire fill, at certain seasons of the year, and
perhaps throug·h an increasingly smaller area of the
fill as the summer season advanced, but still through a
large part of the fill and finally issued in the form of a
spring at the toe of the railroad fill in the land of the
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appellant, and ou all fundamental theories or waten;
rights belong to the appellant. To suggest that the appellant has exclusively held only one of tlw foregoing
eontentions or has abandoned any of them i.s ummpported, a gratuitous assumption.
"DEB'ENDANTS' HEiFUSAL" TO '·RECOGNIZE" (ACCEPT) PLAIN·
TIFF'S DECLARATION OF PLAINTIFF'S PURPOSE
IN THIS ACTION.

On page B is this one: ''Defendants refused and
the.v apparently still refuse to recognize the fact that
plaintiff does not seek by this action to acrznire wny copper solutions it does Hot OWJI." In view of the decision
of this court in the Montana-Bingham <'ase and of the
law set forth in appellants' brief with reference to the
O\\·nership of waters which have passed into the lands
and premises of others, and with referenee to seeping
and pen·olating waters heeoming a part of the land in
whieh the.v seep and percolate, to which respondent docs
not even attempt a.n answer, but on the other hand the
correduess of \Yhi('h is coneede(l, it takes a mighty pecu1iar n1en ta Iity to be able to figure out tlia t plaintiff is
not by these proceed.ings seeking to acquire waters whieh
it doe:,; not O\Yn. These waters are not only within the
lands and prelllises of defc>ndants hut are captured and
reduce(l to possession upon defendants' premiset-l.
Plaintiff's statement in this regard is very much like
that of au exeeutioner about to behead au indivi(lual,
who laug-hingly stated, "I am not going to kill you; I
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am just going to cut your head off.'' By the same argument any person who once had wild animals, waters, oil,
gas, or any of the other roving elements of nature which
are peeuliarly wild and .shifting in contemplation of law,
and the legal rules regarding which are discussed in appellant's brief, and the ownership of which is lost without the will of the person from whose lands or premises
they escape, might very well say, "We will reclaim that
which is lost. \Ve know we have lost title to this wild
and roving thing and that the right to possession and
ownership has passed from us into the hands of another,
but we will condemn our neighbor's land and then we
will not only thereby regain ownership of that which
we have lost, but will in addition take all other wild
animals, gas, oil, water, etc., upon his premises and not
pay him a cent for it, because, perchance, it was once
ours." This is exactly the situation in this ease, and
in this connection it is interesting to note the evidence
of Mr. J. D. Schilling, Mining Superintendent of the
Utah Copper Company. He testified (Tr. 278) as follo·ws:

"Q. And it is your theory, as I understand,
that these waters escape from the dump up
above'?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q. And you intend to capture them down
below some hundreds of feet on the V aleJ1tine
Scrip~

A.

Yes, sir."
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DEFENDANTS CONCEDE NOTHING TO PLAINTIFF
IN THIS ACTION.

Here is another one on page 8: "Were it to have
been found that defendants instead of plaintiff owned
the copper solutions plaintiff sought to convey over the
easements across A, B, C, and D condemned in this action, then this suit would have been dismissed, but defendanls' concessions on the p1·oo{ deprived them of
that defense." \Ve do not know whom plaintiff is seeking to fool by this statement nor to wha,t concessions on
the proof plaintiff refers. Sinec plaintiff docs not particularly state ~what couc•essions on the proof are referred
to, mHl since defendants have always contended that defemlants owned these waters regardless of their source
or e01use after they entered defendants' premises, and
is noiY appealing from the decision of Judge .McDonough
for failure, among other things, to give defendants that
whielt is theirs as a matter of law, we ean only conclude
that plaintiff makes that statement in the hope that such
strong talk will fool someolle. This j,s sheer unsupported
bombast and means nothing.
DID DEFENDANT STIPULATE TO SETTLE FOR $500.00 APPELLANT'S CLAIM FOR $200,000.00 AND UPWARDS?

On page 9 plain tiff says this : "Not one page of
that record is directed to the issue of damages, the ultimate issue in a condemnation suit." After the lower
court had deprived defendants of the right to present
evidence as to the value of the waters within the prem-
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t.ses sought to be taken, what was the use of presenting
evidence upon other matters? Also, where doHs plaintiff get the impression that the ultimate issue in a condemnation suit is damages t The statute prescribes at
lea~-;t thn•e is~-;ues to he presented aml determined before
you even arrive at the question of damages, any one of
wl1ieh preliminary questions may be ultimate. Counsel
would have m; believp that a corporation like the Utah
Copper Company should have the court take judicial
knrmledge of the fact that it is entitled to take the lands
anrl premises of its neighbors with impunity, and thereby, without r:o mpensa.tion, acquire the water~-; thereon,
and simply waive aside the three preliminary issnes prescri,bed by the statute, and proceed immediately to the
taking of evidence a·s to ,the amount of damages, eliminating, of <·ourse, for the benefit of the Utah Copper Compauy, all evideJH'l' of the value of tlw wah•rs within the
lands taken.
"TITLE", OR, AS WE THINK, MORE ACCURATELY, "USE" UNDELt
SEC. 7333, COMPILED LAIYS OF UTAH, 1917, IS THE
MOST IMPORTANT QUESTION IN THIS CASE.

Counsel states this on page~): "This prolonged controversy revolves about only one issue, i. c., i·n lr'hom is
fliP title to the coptJer solutions?" In view of the total
lac·k of nn~-;wur on tlw part of appellaJllt to the law as set
forth in appellant's brief with reference to the owm'rship of \\·ater.s with relation to ownership of the laud we
shonld think counsel would have been afraid to have had
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this the only issue. Certainly plaintiff was not contending for any such proposition, and a reading of defendants' answer and of the evidence taken in the case as
abstracted by appellants shows that evidence was
produced with reference to each and all of the issues
presented by ,the answer.
HOW MUCH IS THE LJ!;GAL ADVIC:E OF THE AT'fORNEYS FOR
THE PLAINTIFF TO THE DEFENDANT AS TO THE BEST
WAY TO PROTECT DEFENDANTS' RIGHTS, WORTH?

On page 9 is this: "De,fendants eould with greater
propriety have sought the relief they desired by suit to
enjoin diversion of eopper solutions of which defendants claim to be the owners.'' This is the first time
plaintiff has presented this idea. In other ~words, they
say that while defendants own the ~waters after they enter ~the lands and premises of defendants, the only
remedy of defendants is to stop the Utah Copper Company, by an injunction suit, from taking them. In other
words, we must sit idly by and consent to a eondemnation case, and then, after that is over, go into an equity
case in the hope that the equity court will reverse that
whieh the c.ourt hearing the condemnation case might do.
It would seem tha~t defendants should have entrusted
their rights to the counsel and advice of plaintiff's attorneys, which would have been, as we rea(l their brief,
to make no defense to the condemnation case excepting
as to the element of damages, eliminating, of eourse, all
evidence as to the value of the waters on the premises,
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take $500.00 as the value of the lan<l without the water,
and then thereafter file an injunciion case in a court of
equity. vVe fear this advice is given over the left
shoulder. Plaintiff is not in a posi,tion to complain about
the forum or the character of :the case in which the issues in this case are tried. It chose the forum and prescribed the character of the case, and so far defen<lants
have been content to rely upon the counsel and advice
of their O\Vll nttorneys as to defcuses thereto all(l proN~dun• to he taken.
There is eontroversy in this case as to ,,·hether or
not on plaintiff's ow11 showi11g there is legal Jweessity
for the plaintiff, if it has the legal right o•tht>r\\·i;-;l' to
eondemn Tracts C and D, because plaintiff ow1Js tile
property higher up the gulch and therefore has mt opporhmity on its ow11 land at compara,tively little expense
to eolled the waten; whieh eome from its dump. On the
other hand, plaintiff dm1ies that there is Hll.'" CPPt:ain opportunit.'· to eollect the waters at any point in the p;nleh
abo1Te Trad C. It is therefore manifest that plaintiff's
positiou is that rrnwt
i:-; the strategic point and the•
only point at whieh appdlaut could colleet the <·opper
waters in Dixon Gulch. How manifestly iusiucere, then•fore, is the repeated suggestion made in re;,;pondent's
brief that the appropriate aml <'OlJRistent aetion for appellant in thl' <lefense of the <'Ondenmation suit ~woul<l
have been to eoucede the right iu plaintiff to eondemn
Tracts C and D and then in anothc'r adi011 to have raise<l
the question of wlwther or not plaintiff was taking de-

c
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femlant 's watt•r in r:i1 ract C. 'Phis woultl not have been
closing tlw door to the barn after the horse was gone; it
would haw~ meant, according to plaintiff's position regarding the exclusive charaeter of r:i1 ract D for capturing
waters in Dixon Gulch, demanding possession of an animal ferm• uahuae after permitting the t'lll'lllY to neqnire
the only ham in whi<·h the wild animal could have been
c:aptnred or <~ontrollcd hy defcndallts. \Ve may have an
exaltnd opinion of our own \Visdom and karning, hnt it
does not extend to a belief t,Jmt we know enough to eon(luet both sides of a law suit with equal success, and we
are 11ot prepared to eoneede even to eounsel for plaintiff that he is as wist• as he thinks he is.
liRIED UP Wl\'l'ERS.

On page 11 plaintiff discusses various little pools of
<·opper "·ater that had spilled over fr·om the rlrain tunnel, awl then said that ''plaintiff piped that part of the
eopper solutions from the drain tunnel to ds intake on
'/'met C, when•by to dry up the little pools of copper water that had been ere a ted by the spilling of the solutions
frmn th<-• past<->J·ly portal of the drain tnmwl.'' Plaintiff
g·in•s no refermwe to any evidence of snell <h·ying np,
and there is 110 sueh evidence i11 the eas<-'. This Htatemrnt
i:-; wholly unsupported by the reron1 and WP ask plaiuti if to prod nee an:· e\'idenct' sustaining sueh statement.
Tlw water oe<·urrences ill lower Dixon Gulch are desnibcd in the brief of appellants, aiH1 these water occunenC<-'s were still then' at the tenuillation of the trial
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and are still there at the present time. There was some
dispute as to t!he source of the copper solutions in these
various plaees deseribed, but no one ever testified that
they dried up when plaintiff piped the wruters from the
drain tunnel to the catehment on Tract C. They persisted
in spite ·O.f such piping.

In this connection we call at-

tention to anot:her statement of plaintiff at the bottom
of the paragraph on page 11, wherein counsel

s~ays:

"When therefore, mention is made of Dixo11 Gulel1 water,
title to which is claimed by defendants, it is only the
HO-ealled 'Hays Spring' copper solutions that are referred to."

Search appeUant 's brief and see whether

this is true.

Also .seek through the brief and find some

place where we waived any title to the drain tunnel
water. These various water occurrencE's have never been
segregated in considering this case, waiving as to one
and claiming as to the ot her. Defendants have presented their ea.se with reference to all water oceurrcnces upon their lands and premises. Drain tunnel waters, of
course, flow through a well defined ehannel in a tunnel,
and the portal to the tunnel is just on the eclge of tJhc
Valentine Scrip, so that it would be an easy matter for
plaintiff to step inside of the tunnel and capture these
waters upon the premises of the B. & G. Raitway. There
is no dispute as to the souree of t1hose waters. Hight of
ownership to the water occurrenees upon defendants'
property has never, orally or in writing, been waived by
defendants.
1

23
DID

PLAI~TLFI<'

"ACQUIRE BY ARRAi'iGEMENT" WITH BOUR-

GARD AND ODDIE "WHAT LITTLE WATER THEHE
WAS IN DIXON GULCH BEFORE THE MAKING
OF PLAINTIFF'S DUMPS"?

Another one: At the bottom of page 11 aml the top
of page 12 counsel .says this: "\Vhat little water there
was in Dixon Gulch before the making of plaintiff's
clump there, plaintiff aequired

h~-

arrangpment with

.Jerome Bourganl and .J. W. Oddie, the original appropriators.''

In the first plaee the record is replete

with evidence that this was not a little 1Pctler, hut, on thP
other hand, was eonsidcrablc; that the waters came from
two or thn'e springs several huncb·ed feet west from the
B. & G. fill, at which waH known as the Pieuic Flats. rrhe
water waH used by Bouq.!,•ard and Oddie and the Bingham
HoteL Plaintiff di(l not own this water nor clid plaintiff base any C'laim upon Hueh alleged ownership, as
shown h)· om~ look at the complaint, nor did plaintiff at
any time, ot· at all, acquire any owner-ship, from Botugard and Oddie. The evidcnee with reference to this
alleged transaction was givPn by Mr. Gooclrieh at page
1.11 of the ahstrad, awl again at transcript 421. Mr.
Goo(lrich testified that the negotiations were never eompleted; that Bourgard was the onl.v one of the owners
who ever signPd Exhibit 2~); that there were others interested. The inHtrument upon which plaintiff now
seeks to .say that it was the owner of Dixon Gulch waters
before Ute fill was put jn is as follows:
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'' EX:HiBIT 29.
No. 286403

This Agreement made and entered into this 16th day
of October, 1911, by and between .Jerome Bourgard, of
the town of Bingham, Salt L·ake County, Utah, party
of the first part and Bingham & Garfield Railway Company, a corporation organized under the laws of Utah,
party of the second part, witnesseth:
That, Whereas, the party of the fir.st part is the
owner and entitled to the use of an undivided one-half
interest in a certain stream of water having its source
in Dixon Gulch, Bingham Canyon, Utah, and
~Whereas, the pa.rty of the second part is desirous
of obtaining the right and privilege of using any surplus water in ·Said stream for culinary purposes only it
is agreed by the parties hereto that for the sum of Oue
Dollar, paid by the party o,f the second part to the party
of the first part, receipt whereof is hereby acknowledgeJ,
the party of the second part shall have the right to impound the waters of said stream and convey the same hy
means of suitable pipes or conduits, to a tank constructed
by the said party of the second part on its own premises, said tank to be connected by means of pipes of
proper size with the pipes or conduits now in use by the
party of the first part, at such point on the main line a3
said party of the first part shall designate and in sucit
a way that the rights of the said party of the first part
to said waters as now enjoyed by him shall not be interfered with or abridged by the party of the second
part.

~Witness

our hands nnd seals the day and date above

written.
.Jerome Bourganl
Bingham & Garfield Railway Company,
Signed By J olm M. Hays, Secretary.
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Witnesses:
Chas. T. S. Parsons
.J. S. Gard.
Oct. 16th, 1911."
~rhis is a splendid example of the hardihood of
plaintiff in confidently stating facts which never existed.

Again at page 13 plaintiff states that the easterly
boundary line of plaintiff's property is the westerly
boundary line of defendants' property. "\Ve have heretofore discussed this point. The Bing'ham & Garfield
Railway Company right-of-way lies between the two.
So much for plaintiff's alleged statement of facts.
Piaiutiff's Argument A seems to be an attempted
answt~r to defendants' law points 1 and 2. Plaintiff's
counsel in this cas,e reminds us somewhat of a. young man
who was attempting to pass a bar examination. He was
asked for the doetrine of "ancient lights". Never having heard of the subject matter and being unwble to make
any answer thereto, he said as follows: ''I have never
heard of the doctrine of 'ancient lights', but to show you
that I know something about law I will give you the rule
m Shelley's case.''
APPELLANT HAS ABANDONED NONE OF APPELLANT'S
DEFENSES.

Finding the la\V all against them upon the proposition of the ownership o·f these waters, regardless of their
source, when they enter the lands and premises of Je-
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fendants, they attempt to set up a few straw men, and
then by giving a detailed abstract of the evidence presentecl hy plaintiff upon the probable source and course
of the waters orcurring within the defendants' premises
hope thereby to divert the attention of the court from
the law presentc'd in the law points. This has to do with
a statement made b.'· counsel which has heretofore been
rnfened to, namely, that if the' solutions ha<l sunk into
the em·th and had passe<l from plaintiff's property and
been comiugled witl1 the waters within adjacent property aml the suht('I'I'Dnean \Yall'rs of the' earth ancl had
Lwcome lost, that tllen they would ('Case to be the propcrt~- of plaintiff and become tlw property of defenrlants.
Plaintiff feels that if they can set that up as the only
defense of defendants aml thereby induce rlef0mhmts to
concede such to he the only defense which defendants
might interpose in this case, that they coul<l thcreh~- shift
the issne and briug defenda11ts out of tlw trenehes to defend this straw mm1. \Ve again call the court's attention
to the fact that this was only o11e of the many defenses
relied upon and was not at all dctermi11ativc' of the case.
WHAT IS A SPIUXG?

Plaintiff in this ease is Yioleutl~· antngouistic to the
nse of the expression "spring" in refen'lll'C' to the occmTmwe of the wall'I'S 011 rrrad D. Its o!JjectiorJ to the
word has never been c·lea rl~· defined. Plaintiff a ppal'l'lltI:· has a vague hut unascertained apprclwnsirm that a
"spring" would hurt plaintiff more than something else
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and therefore secured the trial court's determination
that the water occurrence in dispute is not a spring,
though just what it is if not a spring, the plaintiff has
not disclosed.
"The word 'spring' when applied to water,
means the formation of water that naturally
gushes out of the earth's surface. A spring is a
place where water issues f,rom the ground by
natural forces. lf'umcr v. Seabury, 1:3 N. Y. Supp.
12, 16, 59 Hun. 272 (citing Magoon v. Harris, 46
Vt. 264; Bloodgood v. Ayers, 108 N. Y. 405, 15 N.
~~- 43:3, 2 Am. St. Rep. 443).
" '!Springs', as used in a deed granting the
privilege of taking water from springs, means a
plaee where water by natural forces usually issues from the ground, and docs not include places
where the grantor reached water by orifices in
the ground, a11d where the water did not flow to
the surface. Magoon v. Hal'l'is, 46 Vt. 264, 271.
"A spring is wah>r issuing by natural forees
out of the earth at a particular place.
-'\Vords & Phrases, Vol. 7, p. 6617.
"\Vater rising to the surfal'e of the earth
from below, and either flowing away in the form
of a small stream or standing as a pool or a small
lake, is the definition of a 't>pring'. De WolfHkill v. Smith, 8H Pae. 1001, 1003, 5 Cal. App. 175
(quoting Cent. Diet.)
-\Vonls & PhraHeH (2d Series), Vol. 4, p. GG:L
"1Dvidenee held sufficient to suHtain finding
that waters collected by sunken box 40 feet from
hox first establi:,;lwd, had the same source, and
were part of one spring and eonveyed by deed of
spring; a 'spring' being a marshy area of small
hut dcfini tc extent, wherein underground waters

28
find their way to the surface. Harrison Y. Chaboya, 245 P. 1087, 1088, 198 Cal. 473.
-Words & Phrases (2d Series), Vol. 7, p. 117."
Then' <ll"P numerous definitions in Baldwin's Century Edition of Bouvier's Law Dietionary, commencing
on page 1125, of similar character to the foregoing; and
We'bster 's N e\\' International Dictionary give:,; the following definition:'' Any source of supply, esp. that of a
stream; a 11 issm• of water from the ea J"th ; a natura 1
fountain.''
In the present case plaintiff's own ('OBtention is that
waters falling on its dump, percolate aud seep through
the dump, fiuall.'' finding their "·a;, to tho hotlom of
Dixon Gulch where after, flowing for a EdJOrt distance,
they appear at a collecting poiut through the toe of a
railroad fill. This statemeut, without admitting the colielusions of the deseription as a matter of fact, \\"C respectfully suggest, is a perfectly pennissiblt> desC'ription
of a spring. The waters of a spring always have their
origin a.t a higher level tlum the spri11g. :-:lue!J watl•rs
flow from various som·eus and 11uall.'· re;wh tlw surfncP.
It does not <lest ro_\' the dwracter of thP spring to say
that the water must havP its origiu iu a <'Ousiderable
a rea, and does not des,troy the clunacter of the springto say that prior to the water issuing to the surface it
flo\\·s in a colleeted volurrw. "'"\ll ~wat<'r has been sm-f<tce
water at some time. Even 011 plaintiff's theory the water O<'CillTClH'e on Tract D is a spring-. 'l'he them·~' of
appellant would gin• a widm· source to tht> water and
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would account for the existeJtee• of the water oecnrrenee
in the toe of the fill prior to the placing· of the dump in
Dixon Gulch, commencing in 1926. In our opinion, ;md
the evidence certainly bean; us out, otherwise it is impossible to account for the water prior to the dump, the
water issuing from the Hays Spring at lea:-;t comes from
the entire drainage area of Dixon Gulch, and in all likelihood this area will include hig·her and adjacent lands.
Plaintiff attempts to make considerable out of the fad
that the court fouml agaillst the appellant on appellant's
geologiral theory and also on appdlant 's theory that
tTeu though the water occmTence on Tract D is not a
::;~·11clinal manifestation from distant sources, it still
iucludes water from sources other than plaintiff's dump.
Plaintiff attempt:-; to twit appellant because the court
below did uot agn•p with appellaut awl to cover the appellant with humiliation because of appellant's disaster
Oil tlw trial. It has always semed to appellant that on au
appeal it was mueii safer to eheerfully, carefully, aml
perhaps prayerfully, disclose' to the appellate court the
grounds 011 whieh the d0risiou below rests than to
ehuckle in glee all<l stick out om•'s tougue• at the mere
fact of a preliminary victory.

It took his Honor who tried this <'asc below mon•
than two years to reach a dceisiou favorable to the plaintiff's contention. It cannot he that the basis of plaintiff's elaim is as simple aucl apparent as plaintiff seems
to suggest; awl the• <lifficnlties of arriving at a condusion favorahlP to the plaintiff are, we think, indicated
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by the fact that plaintiff has carefully refrained from
any detailed disclosure of the basis of plaintiff's rights
and from an attempt to support such rights by an appeal to the authorities.
The Hays Spring waters issue from the ground ami
appear through a rock wall. What difference does it
make whether you call it a :Spring'? There can be no
doubt of the fact that this water occurrence comes nearer to being a spring than anything else. It certainly is
not a river, nor is it a creek, nor is it a. well. Plaintiff
says that no witness, with the possible exception of the
defendant Stephen Hays, was produced who testified
that he ever saw a spring in the bottom of Dixon Gulch
either b·efore or after the construction of the railro·ad
fill.
OLD MINERS VS. MAY-WALKER8-WERE THERE WATERS IN
DIXON GULCH BEFOftE THE RAILROAD FILL?

Richard D. Connary, au old miner, testified that he
prospected and mined the sulphide vein in Dixon Gulch
at a point now beneath the B. & G. fill. He stated (Ab.
248) that he sank a hole about five feet deep, close to the
bottom of the canyon, about twenty-five or thirty feet to
the north of the bottom of the gulch on the sulphide vein,
and that he prospected along that vein several years
afterward for different parties, and there were quite a
number of old prospect holes beneath the fill on the north
side along the vein, and that there was water in that
hole (Ab. 249); that water appeared all along the snl-
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phid(' n~m wherever there were any holus dug·; that he
didn't reeall how much water there was, but there ~was
so much that "I eouldn 't do much work there" (AlJ.
250); that it \\Tas so long ago tltat he di(l not remember
the quantity, but "I remember there ~was quite a lot of
water running out of there and these other holes along
up the vein." He stated further (Ab. 251) that some of
the water sank i11 the Roil allll then seemed to appear
again on the soli(l bedroek; that in some years it couhl
be observed by people passing up awl down the canyon,
and in some years it eoulrl not; that there were hig
honlrlers in the bottom of the gulch and there was ronsiderahle gravel collerted there and might not be seen.
Ammon B. Stringham mined in Dixon Gulch at the
lT. & l. Tunnel; that he never went up in the bottom of
thl' gulch but saw men working in Dixon Gulch below
?l'hcre the IJ. d'; 0. fill now is, on the tunnel and inclines
on the side of the hills; thai he always saw water there
coming out of these holes aiHl running- down the side of
the hill (Ab. 262-264); that these holes were along the
::-;ulpl1ide le(lge on the right-hand Hide of the guleh going
up, about seventy-five or one hundre·(l feet up from the
bottom of the gnleh.
Thomas Stringham, brother of the former ~witnes::-;.
testified that he prosperted Dixon Gnleh where the B. &
G. fill is, aud that there 'vas water in that portion of the
gulrh below the Gardelli workings. rrlwre werp two or
three places where the water eauw out there, ancl that
the tunnels were on the right siue, and that in ad(lition
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there was a spring about one hundred feet along the bottom of the gulch which broke out on the side hill; that
the pl,aco whore the bad water came out was a little west
below tho B. & G. fll and is underneath the fill at the
present time.
Tho evidence of these men, in the face of the evidence given by Messrs. Earl, Goodrich, Bowman, Inglesby, Heaston, Straup and Kelly, all of whom testified that
lower Dixon Gulch was a verit,able Sahara, was subsequently demonstrated to be correct and accurate by
the discovery of the two incline shafts at a point on the
sulphide vein beyond the B. & G. fill, but within Tract D.
These discoveries simply shO\ved that the witnesses for
plaintiff, testifying according to their best knowledge,
no doubt, so rar as their observations had disclosed,
showed that these water occurrences beneath the B. & G.
fill were discernable only to the prospector and miner
who worked along the sulphide ledge, because there was
a thick grov..th of underbrush up to the sulphide ledge,
and because all of the water would sink into the soil and
gravel in the guleh and seek the real bottom of tho gulch
(Ab. 213-220-221-239-251-252). The evidence in this case
is undisputed that Dixon Gulch was not a place for much
walking. The 'bottom of the gulch was full of large
rocks and boulders, very precipitous, and at some times
of the year woulrl be swept clear of gravel, and at other
times there would be a lot of gravel on the bottom o·f the
gulch. (Ab. 251) This variation was not only true as to
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seasons of the year, ibut was also true of the various
places within the gulch.
\Veeks were not consumed for the purpose of proving that these waters within Tract D were or were not
a spring. Weeks were consumed in producing- evidence
with reference to all of the defenses prc:-;ented by defendants both on behalf of plaintiff and defendants.
Plaintiff states on page 16 that the whole purpose of defendants' case was consumed to prove that there was a
spring. How silly! Defendants presented evidence with
reference to all of their defenses.
Counsel states that this geologieal fant.asy of the
Hays Spring \Vas a ereature of defendants' ingenuity.
This issuance of water from the ground through this
rock waH upon defendant;.;' premises certainly was no
creature of anyone's ingenuity. It was a reality and of
sufficient reality to become the apple of plaintiff's e.ve,
so much so that it was willing to endeavor to obtain it
for itself by devious and questionable attempts at bargaining in the beginning (A b. 207), and then, their purpose having been ascertained, through these proceedings. They did not want to take the chance of losing this
creature of ingenuity hy tunnelling in to the toe of their
dump, as was done in the Tiewaukee case, to collect for
themselves only such water as they ovvned, because they
knew very well that this creature of ingenuity constituted waters comingling from various sources, aml was
in existence as a reality long before their dump \YHS
placed in Dixon Guleh, which gave positive evidence that

tbis water oecunence cuuld 1wt be an outlet fnnn their
so-called reduction u:u1·ks (plaintiff's dumps).
~Would

plaintiff have us believe that the waters

which were appearing at the I Jays Spring before plaintiff's dumps were established in Dixon Gulrh ·were the
waters from the Bnurga rei ancl Oddie spring at Picnic
}Plats? 'l1 hey never made any sueh claim when the ease
was tried in the lower court, beennse such a theory is
destrndive of their entin' theol'." with reference to these
waters being an outlet fro1n a so-called re<lnction works.
They bad to have these waters eome from their dump,
and all of their Pxpel'is tc'stifiu<l that the;' l<>ft the rlnmp
at the toe of the' B. & G. fill. 'l he~· wanted to be so eertain of this point that 1lw;· l~:Hl tlw trial conri fil1!1 that
a II of these waters <•.orne from this so-C' a llt'd J'l'd udim1
works, and had the court henuetieally seal the surfa<'e
soils underneath the dumps in Dixon Gulch, tog-ether
with all of the t•racks alHl fissul'l'S in tlw roeks beneath
the same, and to render that soil substantially impermenblP to the waterl'J .flowi11q dmnt thro11.f/h the
rlmnps, and that "all such wa tc'rs an' confined to the top
of the surfaC'l' soil undcrnea th the <lumps". vY e are
wondering ho\\' thl~se Bourgard and Odclie spring waters
got up into thP tlumps so that they could flow along thP
top of the surface soils and gl't out of this slwleylike
snhstmwc'. Of c·ourse plaintiff' had to lwrmetically seal
the dump or it would not have heen a reservoir. (Rpcaking of ereatures of imagination or ingenuity, we want the
ronrt to remembt>J' that plaintiff has had to have a. Yer~·
1
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vivid imagination to have this great big dump a reservoir or sponge; this entire gulch, including the bottom
and both sides, filled up -with the railroad fill, he a ditch
or canal; and this dump a reduction works within the
contemplation of our law relating to eminent domain.
So much for digression.)
The ·witness T£ad testified (Alb. 110) that there was
a spring about forty-five feet above the railroad iill and
one about 800 or 900 or 1000 feet farther up, and further
testified (Ab. 112) that the waters which Oddie and
Bourgard were using in l~J12 were arising on the Valentine Scrip patent:

"Q. That water that you havce described
which Oddie and Bourgarcl was using was arising
on the Valentine Scrip patent 1
A. It was being collected on the V aleutine
Scrip patent. Where it was arising I couldn't
say because it was coming out right undt•r the toe
of the Bingham and Garfield Railroad fill.
Q. Coming out on the left~
A. It dipped to the left.
Q. Is that the ~.;ame plaee where it is coming· out now'?
A. I eouldn 't say, it is all covered with fill
now and nobody can see it. If I might indieate
on this exhibit I will shnw you about_:_
Q. Yes, I will ask you to do it 'I
A. It is somewhere in this vicinity right
here is where the water was coming out where I
have marked with a cross up there, that is after
the original construction of the Bingham & Gar-

field Railroad and the fill had been placed in
there.''
He testified further that after the waters from the
Picnic :B'la 1s Spring-s ceased to be diverted by the Bingham & Garfield Railway Company in 1915, that such waters (Ab. J~fi) were not flowing through the drain tunnel; 1lmt he did llo1 know what became of it; "that all I
kno\\· is that it \\~as not lll~ing taken away from there and
was Hot appearillg· below OJ\ the surfaee in the low season
of tlw .H~ar. It just was not appenrillg on the sm·face.
I am speakillg mdy of 1he d l'.'' sem;oll. I did not see it
during the we.t season either. I jns1 obse1·vecl the water
running in the reservoir nbove the H. & G. fill and do
not know u;Jwf her:a.mr of it.'·'
'l'hese Bourgard and Odrlie Hpring waters wen• also
described by A. L. Heaston, Olle of the plaintiff's ·witnesses, who testified (Ab. 189) that af.tcr these ·waters
left the ::;prings they flowed for a short distmH·e on thP
surfaee at certain 1irnes of the .''Cal'. !lis e\'idPllCP is as
follows:
"(~.
\\' ould :·on sa:' t heu ,jfw t o1 her tlw n in
the sp rillg of the :·ear wa tPr from t host• sp ri11gs
flowecl on!:· a slwrt distanee?
A. It flcl\ved a short distance, ,VL'S sir, a]}(l
when it got to where there was gran~! awl loos··
stuff, i.t \\·onld sink.
Q. Disappear'?

A.

Disappear, ye:-; sir."

Mr. Earl further h•stifie<l (Ab. 4G7) that these spring·
waters, after tltP)' left the re:-;crvoir ahont a thousancl

feet west of the B. & G. fill seeped through or under the
fill aw 1 went down below; that in hi:,; opinion it seeped
down through the fill, ei i her through the fill or underneath the fill. "lt may never have appeared on the surfaeL~ helo,v, but it certainly came down belo·w."

If thi:,; evidem·e is corrL•ct-and plaintiff 1s in a poor
position to dispute it heeause it was produced hy its own
witnesses-then then• ean Jw no rlouht of the fad that
tlw reappearauce of thesp waters out of the gravel on
defendants' premises emtstituted a spring from snbternmean seepings and pereolations, and these waters
are not from the• dump of plaintiff and never were in this
so-callc•d reductioiJ works. If th<~se waters sank to depth
and found a ('Ourse along bedroek, then it would seem
that Uwre \Vas rather a substantial hole in this sealing
process-in this so-called reservoir described by Mr.
Beeson as lwiug a "reservoir within a reservoir", and
we ('ertainly SPL' no reason for not giving the waters
which \Yen• appearing at th(_• Hays Spring before plaintiff's dumps WL~rc in Dixon Gulch a tmbterranean eourse,
either beneath thP fill or into the synelinal basin and out
over the snlphi<le ledgt•, as des<"ribed by Dr. Pack and
Mr. Crane, and as demonstrated beyowl all question hy
the waters in the north and south incline shafts.
THJ<] GEOLOGISTS.

None of plaintiff's geologists and experts stated,
however, that the waters appearing at the Hays Spring
were the Hourgan1 awl Od<lie waters. They all testi-
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fied that the Hays Spring waters were from the dump;
that they trirkled along the top of the surface soils
beneath the dump and then seeped and percolated
through the fill along a wide expanse of wash mat.erial,
which was described by plaintiff as "semi-pervious",
but which was described ·by witnesses for defendants as
bt>ing impervious to the downward pas::mge of the water
-such as to stop the water at that point from sinking
into the so-called French drain in the bottom of the
gulch. At first, plaintiff's witnesses testified that these
water:,; passed through the :B,rench drain, but a reading
of the evidenee of Mr. Beeson showed that that was completely abandoned, and on one occasion counsel for
plaintiff clesrribed any such theory as "sheer nonsense"
(Ab. 373-374).
How can plaintiff and defendant escape the only
logical conelusion to whleh a reasonably mill<1ed person
must come after reading the evidence of lay witnesses
on both sides, and of experts bought and paid for and
produced by both sides, to-wit, that the waters appearing on Tract D (the Hays Spring and all of the rest of
them) are from various different :,;ources, to-wit, from
the sulphide vein from the Picnic :B,lat Springs, reappearing· after their subterranean course (and in this
connection the court will bear in mind that Mr. Earl
testified that in his opinion the gravels (Tr. 2275) are
very deep at the toe of plaintiff's dumps against the B.
& G. fill, and that it would be necessary to go considerable depth to shut off the waters); also that a portion
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of these waters eo me from pnwipi tation u po11 the B. &
G. fill, which is a substantial area aml composed largely
of similar material to that within the dump:-;, anJ whicl1
fill has been by the trial court decree<l to be a part of tlw
premi::;es of defendants, and with reference to which
finding no cross appeal is taken, nor is there any attempted answer on the part of plaiuiiff as to the argument made in law point 2 as to our owner:-;hip thereof
so far as these watm·s are c·oucc•nJed.
Plaintiff's brief, mJdc•r snhlwacling A of argument
II, eommeueing at pagl' 14 of the brief and ending at
page• (i4, iR nothing more nor les::; than a one-sided abstraet of plaintiff's own c>viclenec•. vYe assume eounsel
feelR that this eourt intl'mls to read the briefs only and
pa~c no attention whatsoever to tl1e abstraet of all of
the e\·idew·c• producNl in this case by both parties.
In ,-iew of this situation it is a great temptatio11 to
defendants to meet this sort of tactics by likewise quoting from tlw evidence, and doing so with great partiality
to rlefendaints' side of the case.
Defend;mts have no controvers:· with the evidence
of Dr. lnglc>s'b:·, Dr. Straup, Mr. Heaston, Mr. Hocking
or Charles Kelly. rl1 hey were easual visitors in Dixon
Gulch, but it was no place for pleasure seekers because
thl' bottom of the gnleb was precipitous in plaees ancl
was full of big houlden;. rrhe path to Picnic Flats was
along the top of the ridg·e to the left (Ah. 257). Dr.
Straup, however, used to go into the gulch during the
month of May to <·onrt his sweetheart-the present Mrs.
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Dr. Straup-and he frankly admitted that when he \Vas
in the gulch h·e was looking for soft places on which to
sit a]l(l was not looking for water seeping over sulphide
ledges. The same with Dr. Inglesby. He was just a Maywalker in the gulch. All of these witnesses testified absolutely that there were no water occurrences on this
tract in question, and yet within a day or two after they
gave their evidence we found water coming over the
sulphide ledge at the two inoline shafts. They simply
were not looking for water occurrences when they were
in there, and had no such opportunity for information
as the old miners who were presented by the defendants,
and whose evidence has heretofore been quoted.
Defendants produced Dr. Frederick .J. Pack, of the
University of Utah, Guy W. Crane, geologist for the
Chief Consolidated Mining Company of :B~ureka, Leland
H. Kimball, hydraulic engineer, and Ronald M. Crocker,
eminent mining engineer, all of whom testifie<l for defendants. Their evidence is a;bstracted and set forth as
given in the abstract which has been presented in this
case. They completely destroyed and filled up the socalled French drain which plaintiff at first relied upon
for the passage of these waters through the railroad
fill, and they did it so effectually and so completely that
counsel for plaintiff finally, in open e{mrt, announced the
abandonment of such an idea (Ab. iH::l-:374), and it was
never heard of again. From there on they took the
view, as oxprosse<l by Mr. Beeson and ~fr. :BJarl, that
these copper solutions as they arrive at the point of
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contact with the B. & G. fill, seep and percolate laterally
out through the fill.
'' Q. What have you assumed to be the condition of the first flume from your lower wing of
the upper portal of the drain tunnel, what have
you assumed to be the condition of that terrain'!
A. I have assumed that to be-l hadn't
really given it very much thought because my eonception of the way those solutions, these copper
waters passed through there is that they eueounter instead of an impervious seal it is just semipervious, that is it simply prevents the flow from
being rapid, and that the copper waters will
eYentuall~· percolate through it.
Q.

Thnt is your seal against the toe of the

A.

Yes sir.

Q.

You think that is semi-pervious"?

A.

Yes,Ithinkitis.

fill?

Q. That the waters percolate uownward
thrQugh that and into the fill and percolate out
through the fill until they reach the bottom of the
gulch and appear down at the Hays spring, is
that your idea?

A. That is right.
Q. Does that extend across the entire upward toe of the fill?
A. I should think so.
Q. So that when you said it flowed down
through the fill, you didn't know of any particular channel in which they were coursing down
through the fill, did ~·ou 1 You have seen no evidence of that, have yon?
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A. No, not of any particular channel except
when it comes out, when I have observed it, it all
came out at one place.
Q. I think you stated those waters are seeping and percolating in the fill, in the soil ahove
the fill and above bed-rock, is that correct?
A.

Yes, that is right.

Q. You ohs('rved the ~water percolation between bed-rock and the collar of the raise in the
caiehmeut tunnel, did you not, Mr. Beason?

A.
Of.:

Yes, I think I observed that."

*

*

"(~. Is that the character, the salllL' gpm•ral
charader of water ~::eepage and JWreoJation yon
have <leserilJed iu your evidem•e-is ilH' way tltL'
water leavc>s the fill and <'OmPs <lowll to tlw point
where it aceumulates for th(' making of thP Ha~'s
spring similar to that appearanee that is in the
shnft there or in tlw raisP?

A. Yes, I think it is. I believe then• nre
phwes in the bottom of tltc> stream whc•n• thf~
gravel would have a certain amount of mwl iu
it and .force mon• water to comt> out right in the
lwd of the strc•am than otht>rs." (Ab. ;)01-flO:n
Defendants' geologists and pngineers testifie<l that
this sy11clinal basin was eompose<l of massive quartzite
as a bast>, on tlw top of which the ;ml,pbi<le lc>dgP, and
that within the hasin is a great nms:-; of slwttered quartzite, incompl'ieni to bold wat<)r, eapped by a thin layer
of sm,face soil all(l rode debris. 'l'lwy tPstified that iu
their opinion it wa:-; a physieal impossibilit~· to plaeL>
npo11 this grouwl a large reservoir or spongl', drippi11g
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wet and full of water, without having that water pass
out in every direction, except up, into the surrounding
areas; that on account of the broken, fractured, and incompetent character of the quartzite lying above the
sulphide ledge, that these waters would naturally find
their way out into the surrounding country, t.hen downward to the sulphide ledge, and then pass over the lip
of the synclinal basin wherever it could, and thus add t.o
the waters which had theretofore been appearing at the
Rays Spring. This basin is not a hollow one, but is full
of shattered and fractured materials, and the waters
within the rbasin arc seeping and pereolating in various
direetions, always seeking the lower levels. They do not
cominglc and become an admixture in the sense that
waters do when placed within a hollow basin, but they
have their areas and particular localities within the
basin. rrhe north and south inclines are admittedly not
at the axis of the syncline, and yet we find water coming
out in these localities varying in quality within a distance of twenty feet of each other, and o·ther waters were
fonml along· the sulphide ledge during the course of
trial farther north and farther up on the limb of the
syncline. These experts tesrtified that it was only natural that these waters from this so-called reservoir or
sponge, lying immediately above the sulphide ledge in
Dixon Gulch, should find their way out on the sulphide
ledge at a point beneath the B. & G. fill-the lowest point
ou the wlphide ledge in Dixon Gulch-regardless of
whether it is the axis of the syncline, as testified by !lefendants' experts, or slightly to the right of the axis,
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as testified by plaintiff's experts, and then appear on
the surfare at the Hays Spring ann at the other points
aB testified.
In this cmmeetion plaintiff was none too proud of
the evidenee of one of its so-called experts-Mr.
F'rederick D. Hans.on. The eonrt will notil'e that while
plaintiff quotes extensively from the evidence of Mr.
Beeson, it ga\'e but a short paragraph to ~lr. Hanson.
This expert is the oue who sealed the surface soils heneatlJ plaintiff's rlumps and compressed them into a

shale-like substance. In fact, he was so sure it was shale
that he went out to a point in the Niagara drain tunnd
lwnen fh t lw U tall Coppm· ColliJlan~· d Ulllp in Di xm 1
Gulch. Hr~ stole into tltis tunuel awlmadl' extcusi\'C and
profoull<l observations aml viewed the premises wit11
great skill and learning. He foul\(l tltP soil ltard awl
finn, not easy to pick into and pir·k out a pil'f'l'. 'l'here
\nls also imlif'ation of eleavage and parting rmra1lel to
the snrface of the soil, and in geueral the soil hall a coHIJn·essC'd, compaf't a ppl'H ra m·e, somewhat rcse1uhliug the
formation iu a heddiug of shale (A·b. 50!-:J-510). Upon
r·ross-exalllination defendants had l1irn definitely locate
tlw spo·t where he had made these profound awl learncrl
oh~crYations so that there mig·ht bP no mistake ·with n•fcrcm·e to the exact spot. 'l'!Jercaftl'r Mr. Crocker and
a mining engineer uamed 8hclton went to the place, took
a sampll~ of the material, and broug-ht it in to court. It
was introduced in cvidcnf'e, and lo mHl behold it turned
ont to bl' plain, eYPn'fla~' ma11nrr (Ah. 5GI) aurl should
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have been handled with a pitch-fork. Mr. Shelton called
it leaf mold. He and counsel for plaintiff had quite a
dispute (Ab. 567-568) as to whether it waR manure or
leaf mold. This is the shale-like substance '\vhich Mr.
Hanson found, and upon this evidenee eounsel for the
plaintiff had the court make finding of fact No. XXX[II
to the effect that the weight of the dump compresses the
surfa('<' soil and gives it a ('Ompaci appearal\(·(~ .
.Just at this point it ma~· not lw amiss also-sinee
plaintiff complains bitterly ahout tlw amount of time
bkcu by defendantH in presenting their case, and also
takes eomiderablo delight in calling attention of the
court to tlw fad that on one or hYo minor details there
was some slight varianec between the evidence of Dr.
Pad~ aml Mr. Crane-to <'all attention of the court to
tlle fact that Mr. Earl, who disclaimed being a mining
engineer or !JnYing <my knowledge wha.tsoever of water
or water courses, etc'., (All. lOG, Tr. 103-104) and yet
presum(_•d to niticise the opinion of his ehief, Mr. Goodrich, and o.f .Mr. Crocker with reference to the possibility
of <'olloeting th!:'SL' solutions at th(_• toe of plaintiff's
<lump, but who nevertheless was a halHl.'· witness and
sern~d the fullctions of utility mmt on the Utah Copper
Company team of witnesses, and who evidently on some
oc<·asionH might be able to make a survey with a transit,
eommmed RL'Vcral <lays of th!:' c·onrt's time trying to
pro\·e a surn~y of tho area now eovered by the <lump~
in Dixon Guleb which was made in 1924. After Mr. Earl
had testified at great length awl at great expense to both
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parties, and had taken personal credit and responsibility
for the survey ('Tr. 2220), and one witness had been
brought from Los Angeles to identify notes, etc., and
others had been produced to show how carefully these
notes were safeguarded, indexed and filed, it was found
that this great surveyor, this man who disputed with Mr.
H. C. Goodrich, chief engineer of the Utah Copper Company-the head of his department-on such an important proposition as the possibility of capturing the Utah
Copper Company solutions at the toe of their dump, in
order to make one observation called for in that survey
would have, been required to see through a hill, and tha,t
in order to see the top of the rod, being held as high as
the tallest rodman could hold, and with the transit at
the very highest point, he would have been compelled to
see seven f>eet underground ( Tr. 2485), and the whole
thing was thrown out as inaccurate and worthless (Tr.
2480-2481-3141). Several days were lost, and this gTeat
engineer, Mr. Earl, took his place on the bench along
side of Mr. Hanson, the great geologist, who disoovered
the shale-like substance hereinbefore referred to. This
evidence of Mr. Earl's was so utterly worthless and
valueless, and so unreliable that it was eliminated from
the abstract by mutual understanding.
So much for the experts produced by plaintiff.
\Ve are not going to weary this court with a further
detail of the evidence presented to the trial court by
defendants and its witnesses, upon the proposition of
geology and water courses. vVe are going to assume
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that this court will be able to reau that evidenee and appreciate and understand it. Suffice it to say that there
was a su bstantia1 eonflict. It was no such one-sided
proposition as that attempted to be s,tated by plaintiff
in its brief. Jn faet, it was so substantial that .fudge
MeDonough took about two mul one-half years to decide
the ease, and ,then when referring to the court's decision
upon this matter the court said as follo·ws: ''This phase
of the law suit is the• one that has caused the court the
greatest difficulty insofar as t be labor of reacl1ing a eonelusion tlwn·on is eoneenwc1, as it necessitated, after the
filing of counsel'::; brief, a re-examination of a great
portion of the evidenee with refereuce thereto and to the
notes of the eourt with reference to actual observations."
1

WHO PUT THE COPPER IN THE WATE!t?

Under poiut liT, commeneing at page 59 of the brief,
plaintiff attempts to explain how the Hays Spring waters came to han• a copper content years before the Utah
Copper

Compan~·

dumps i11 Dixon Gulch were placed

then•. He states that W<' relied very largely upon the
evideuce of George B. Robbe•, a wihwss called for plaintiff. It is tnw that we believed the evidence of the witness Hobbe, but in addition there is the evidence of
Samuel Baird wlw visited at the .Jensen home, 11car the
nwuth of Dixo11 Gul(·h, bc•tweeu the mi<ldle of August
until 0<1tobe1·, i11 l~J:25, who made te::;is of thi;; water with
some• uails and found that there was sufficient eopper iu
the water to produce enough copper on the nails after
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a'bont u week's time that it could be scratched off; likewise 0. S ..TPnsen, who lived at the mouth of Dixon Gulch,
testified that for four years, commencing in 1924, he had
oibserved these waters and that there was a greenish
stain ou the flume, that the icicles on the cribbing had a
green tinge, and that his children put iron and nails and
an old clevis in the water about two years ago (1926) and
that it showed a coating of copper colored matter all
over the iron ; likewise, :Mrs. .T ensen testified that the
children had put numerous articles in the water, and
that a substance was coated on the outside of them, and
that the children brought them to her and showed them.
Counsel states that this copper content comes from
the B. & G. fill. Assuming that to be true, where does
this argument help plaintiff? The trial court found the
fill to belong to defendants so far as the right to capture
water thereon is concerned (Alb. 626).
This evidence given by both parties not only showed
a sTrbstantial but also a continuous copper content in the
Hays Spring waters for years before the dumps were
placed in Dixon Gulch. Do we understand that the court
is going to determine which part of the copper content of
these waters comes from the dump and which part from
the fill~
We doubt, however, if plaintiff can explain this situation by saying that this copper content comes from the
fill. The fill was placed in Dixon Gulch in 1910. Plaintiff claims that the Hays Spring- waters were potable and
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good to drink until 1919 and 1920 and that there was a
pool of water where the boys swam back of some vegetation and reeds and rushes. The copper seems to have
appeared in 1919 or 1920, because Mr. Connary testified
that there was acid and copper in the water in 1919 to
surh an extent that they could not use it for their carbide lamps, and Mr. Robbe testified that it contained copper in 1920. Plaintiff now says that these dumps and
fills start giving off copper immediately, and that it
takes four or five years before they start giving off commercial solnt ions. If that is true then this fill should
have been giviug off copper immediately following 1910.
Again we must conelucle with Dr. Pack and Mr.
Crane that undoubtedly the copper content in the Hays
Spring water::.; is from variou::.; sources; from the fill,
from the springs in Picnie "B'lats, from plaintiff's dump
in Dixon Gulch, anu from all the ores and rocks upon
and within the Dixon Gulch surfaee and sub-surface
drainage area::.; (kb. 403-404).
THE EXPERIMENTS.

Counsel has quoted at great length and gusto with
reference to three experiments which were made by the
pouring of wa,ter at various place::.;. "\Ye are surprised
that plaintiff refers to them, because they certainly turned out disastrously for plaintiff.
Experiment No. 1: The water was placed on the top
of the B. & G. fill (not the Utah Copper dumps) in great
quantities from a two-iueh pipe. It was turnerl on at
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1 :25 P. M. and the H:ays Spring showed an mcrease at

8:00P.M. (Ab. 329).
As to the second experiment eounl:·;el for plaintiff
seems to have gotten all mixed up. 'l'he Hays 8pring figurPs are quoted for the drain tunnel, and the drain tunnel
figures are qnot!~d for the Hays Spring. In otliL'r wonls,
it was the B. & G. drain tmmel which was flowing 6000
gallons per twenty-four hours when the water was turned
on, and whicl1 WaR flowing (il ,~l20 gallons per twt~uty
fonr hours OHP hour later, and renclwd a maxinnun flow
of 108,000 gallouR h)· 3:05 P.M. The lla.vs Spring showed
a slight increase as a result of this flooding, but it was
s]l0\\'11 (Ah. :32:1 alHl ;j27) that this in!•reasl' \\·as surplus
and overflow from the drain tunnel. The water was
coming through the drain tunnel and dO\\'ll tllP rnouutain
iuto Dixon Gul!'IJ in such quautit ies that tht• flun1t> could
not contain it, and it was splashing o\·er i11to tht> Hays
Spring. The increase of water coming through the drain
tunnel a('comded for all of the water that was poured in
thiR experiment (Ab. :324).

It will therefon• be seen that ('Ollllsel for plaintiff
was arguing against himself in eitiug this t>xrwrimeut,
and all of the good things which eounsel intenlled to infpr from this experiment, aR demonstrate!l on page 4:~
of their brief, ~were for the Hays Spring, and tht• bad
thingl"\ intendecl to he shown have to do with tlJC draiu
tunneL
'l'he third experiment was on November 1, 1928. The
water was ponrell on the dump immedin,Jel~· ahoye tlw
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old placer gravel beds, which are plainly to be seen in
the cut for B. & G. Railway. These gravels pass beneath
the B. & G. fill. The water was turned on at twelve o'clock noon, and the first increase in the Hays Spring was
at 10:04 P. M., and the maximum was reached at eleven
A.M. on November 22nd.
The first experiment showed nothing excepting that
if you poured water on the top of the B. & G. fill it would

sink.

No one ever doubted that.

rrhe second experi-

ment established beyond all question of a doubt that
water goiug down through the dump flooded the area
back nf the B. & G. fill and passed into the drain tunnel.
CJ'he third experiment showed that after many hours
waters which are placed upon the dump above the old
placer gravels will eventually seep and pereolate down
to the Hays Spring, or that the flood area bark of the
fill can be flooded to such an extent that it will pa;,;s out
lateraiTy through the fill. Of conrse, if you pour enougll
water upon anything you will floo(l it.
These demonstrations did not prove the source of
the Hays Spring waters at all. Dr. Pack discussed these
experiments and the reliability of them, and stated that
no pouring such as this could be regarded as a duplicate
of nature's slow proeess, and that the information obtained in that manner proved nothing of value in this
case (Ab. 399-400).
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THE REAL QUESTION IS NOT WHERE DID THE COPPER COME
FROM BUT, WHO DOES IT GO TO?

Defendants gladl~· aecept tlw <·halleng-e of plaintiff
to <lisntss and lwYe this aPJwllate eonri paRs upon all
the eYidence prese1decl b)· both sides v,·ith ref'pJ·enel' to
the geological ease, ami with reference to all othPr issm•s
raised by defendants' answer. 'rho evi<lence is jmpartially and fairly ahst raeted and will not bt> difficult to follo\L \Ve weleomr plaintiff's clwlleng-n to a n~considera
tion of those issues of fad.
Iu presenti11g this easr to the appella.ie eourt, howt'ver, we di<lnot feel that it was necessary to plaee upon
the appellate rourt Hw burden of reviewing these facts,
and lwnre based our appeal upm1 the \llHlispntcd facts
and the law relating to them, and took the position that
regardless of the eom·s<• m· source nt' the,.;e watl•rs withi11
Tmd D that tl1e~· ·belong to defeJI(lants, and that befon•
an.\"OJle can take the ground tl1e~· nmst JHl~· the Yalne
thereof, incln<ling thl• Ya1ne of the water.
Instead, howL•n•r, of ans\n~ring or pnm aitPillflting
to answer defendants upon the propositions of law
presented by the appeal, plainiiff, like the fpllow wl10
answered with referenee to the rnle i11 iShelle~·'s ease,
thought it was a good idea to discuss somdhi11g entirely
different from that which 1s presented by tile appeal ann
to lure this appellatP eourt a wa~· from the questions on
appeal by unfairly, wiih great partialit:· a11d inadequate!:·, presentiHg· somp of t lw evidelH'l' eonsiclere(l b~· t hl•
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trial court, and only such evidence as plaintiff deemed
to be favorable to its side. Apparently eounsel for
plaintiff cannot meet the arguments l'ontainP<l Jll bw
points I awl II as presented by defendants.
\V e shall therefore simply conclude that these waten; occurring at the Hays Spring, north incline shaft,
sonth incline ;;haft, Hays upper cnt, Hay;; lower cut, and
in the catehment upon Trad C eome from variou;; sources
an(1 derivl' their copper co11lmtt al;;o from various
sonrees. They do uot have the same ehemieal composition as the Utah Copper Compan.v dump water::; as collected in the dn1in tunnel, aml contai11 a very high percentage of ::;ilica, which could not have been picked up in
the course of a trip through the B. & G. fill eonsisting· of
only a few hours. Glass is made from silica ancl is praetieally indissolnble in the presence of water, and yet
the 11ays Spring wnh•1·s contain a great deal more sili•ca
tha11 the waters in tlte drain tunnel, showing that these
water;; have been in eontnf't with quartzite for a long
period of time, so as to accumulate sucl1 a burden of
Rilica. The same is true of other elemeHt.s in the water.
(See Cram•, A'b. :3S/-:l60, as corroborated h~· Harms, Ab.
447-448).
\V e eould go on indefinitel~T' a:,; di(l plaintiff, awl
re-abstract an(l re-tell all of the evidence presentt>d h~·
defendants, which macll' it .,o difficult for the lower
court to llecide tlw ease. \V l~ wil1 not do so aud simply
ask this appellate eourt to disreg-ard thPse arguments
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upon disputed facts with reference to the geology, and
decide the questions of law presented by the appeal.
·what answer, therefore, has plaintiff made to the
law argument made in law points I and II by defendants·? The amnver comes back, ''none''.
\Vhat differPnce docs it make >vhcre the copper
comes from 1
We aRsullw, of course, with argument that this court
IS going to reg-ard coppc1· wa tor as water the samo as
sulphur water, salt water, and any other water containing
mineral. The sonree of the mineral has nothing whatsoever to do with the title to the water and has no bearing ou the case whatsoever, excepting as trying to determine the source-and since this water had copper for
years before the dumps were placed in Dixon Gulch and
had a substantial content in 1924, 1925, 1926 and 1927
we do not see how this court, or any other court, can sa)'
what part of the copper content eame from one source
and What part from another.
The expert witnesses for plaintiff testified that the
porphyry dyke whieh passes through the Smith (Hays)
tnnnel workings on the right hand side of Dixon Gulch,
and which shows at the Hays Lower Cut, is eonnccltcd
with the porphyry showing near the south incline, and
that iu their opinion this is a dyke whid1 extends up
acrosR lower Dixon Gulch so as to cut off the downward
course of the subterranean waters in Dixon Gulch. This
was fine theorizing and is an excellent example of what
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counsel for plaintiff says with referenec to theorizing
venm::; actual facts. The Smith (Hays) tunnel enters
the mountain at the rear of some hou.sc.s 011 the right
hand sic1e of Dixon Gulch. It follows this porpl1yry occurrc·nec for some distam·e, awl it makes n sharp turn
to the left, passing through the porphyry and out into
the quartzite. The <'onrt will ob:,;erve, therefore, that
this quartzite that they pa:,;sed into would be below the
porphyry and this so-eallPd porphyry dyke ·would lie
between thi:,; area and the upper portion of Dixon Guleh.
The point where the Smith tmmel went out through tl1e
porphyry alHl into the quartzite was just on the right
hawl side of Dixon Gulch near the Hays lower cut (Ab.
:20~)).
~ir. Bowman, the old miner who testified for
plaintiff mHl who worked in this tunnel, testified (Ab.
183) tlmt just a:,; :,;oon a:,; they got out of the porph,ny
awl into the quartzite they got a good stream of water.
Mr. S . .J. Hays testified (Ab. 241) that lower Dixon
Gulch i:,; a veritable ocean and yon can develop water
anywhere. This was also the statement of .Judge Kenncr (Ab. :Wl).
Plaintiff states that tl1is copper solution is an artificial product rn·o<lnc<)d b~· plaintiff's indm:try. 'rhis
dump material iR wa:,;te matter whic·h they were glad to
get rid of. The only iwlustry that plaintiff pnt in on
the matter was to haul it away beeause they eould make
no other use of it, and clump it in the guleh.

It is nature's eoppor and the meteoric waters which
dcseend upon the dump arc a free gift of nature.

fl(i
ALL WE (BOTH PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT) WANT
IS THE COPPER.

On page 17 and again on page 91 of plaintiff's brief
a point is attempted to he made by the assertion that all
the appellant wants is the copper in the copper
solutions in 'rract D. We admit it, both for ourselves and for the pla•intiff, if there is anyone in this
ease who wants simply the water and not the copper in
the water solutions, he, she, or it is a strange personality, but to say that the appellant wants appellant's copper solution:,; is to bring no railing accusation against
the appellant, and this law suit is being tried not to determine a moral but a legal question. The moral question will arise after the adion is terminated and we will
then disf'over whether or not either party to the action
wants copper solutions belonging to the other party, and
whether or not, the matter having been determined, the
party against whom the determination falls ·will promptly desist from its effort to acquire the copper solutions
belonging to the other party and also promptly account
for those already taken.
THE CHARGE THAT THE DEFENDANT HAS MISLED THE
PLAINTIFF AND THAT THE PLAINTIFF ONLY NOW
DISCOVERS THAT THE APPELLANT HAS AT ALL
TIMES CLAIMED THE' WATERS IN TRACT D.

On pp. 75 and 76 of respondent's brief the suggestion, whether humorously or not, is made that because in the stipulation a bond of only ten thousand dol-
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lars was exacted, defendant 1s either limited m
its demand to that sum or thereby gave plaintiff the
right to suppose that defendant regarded ten thousand
dollars as the limit of defendants' damages for occupation and collecting of waters in Tract D in case the plaintiff fails in this action. \Ve say that we find it difficult to
determine whether or not this argument is seriously advanced or only humorously suggestive, alHl our difficulty
is increased by reason of the fact that eontact with our
brothers on the other side does not warrant us in regarding the sonl-sa ving gra.ee of humor as one of their
fortunate possessions; otherwise we would conclude that
the suggestion that plaintiff has been misled as one advanced either with the tongue in the cheek or the twinkle
iu the eye. ~'rom the start defeutlaut has claimed that
the plaiutiff in taking the copper solutions in Tract D
was taking the defendant's property. A bond of ten
thousand dollars was regarded as a suHicient bond, not
because it was felt that the possibilities of recovery in
this case were iu any \Vay limited to a bond. On the
contrary, defendant has always reganled the plaintiff
as amply able without a bond to respond to any judgment that might be recovered against it. But by dedefendant's pleading plaintiff was warned that it was
taking defendant's property while it occupied "pending
the action" and "without prejudice" the property of
the defendant.
There is another inciclent of this action which may
well be considered in this connection and that is the fact
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tha.t none of the parties hereto ever dreamed that it
would take four years to determine as serious an action as this is in its effect upon the rights of the parties.
The court \\"ill discover in the transeript (p. 4027, Janua r~- 17, 19:-n ) that one year and a half after the case had
been tried a motion vvas made in the lower court that the
plaintiff he required to ae.eount for the copper waters it
had taken aml to impound the proeeeds from the sale of
such copper waters. At the time ! his motion was brought
to the attention of the court tlw trial court annoUI1Ced
that within a Rhor! time a deciRion would be remlered. It
is only because of the death of thP late Monis L. Ritchie
and the neecssit;· of a rehearing of the cast> by his
Honor who finally disposed of it on the trial, and the
great IPngtll of tim(' l"P(juirc<l in reachiug tlw dceision by
thP lower eourt, that the amount of the bond in this ease
is so insig11ifieant iiJ eomparison witl1 !lw ndnal values
involved. It 'vill be noted that thr deeision in this case
"'as rcudercd by the trial eourt 011 ~lareh :lnl of this
year, and that the appellant has brought tlw case into
the amwllatc eourt with record speP<L :-Jo <lela~· 111
bringing this action to a prompt conelnsi(lll ean be
charged upon thP appellall1.
In this conned ion, ou pag-e 7ti of respondent's brief
we arc ehargcd with having ehar!ged the authors of respondent's brief \Yith being "eute". Rcfcrenee to our
brief will disclose that there was nothing personal in
our eharacterizatiou. 'l1 lw argulllcnt thai thP occupation of the dcfenda11 t 'R premi Res and tlw collediou of
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copper solutions therein by the plaintiff authorized by
the order of occupancy "pending the action" and "without prejudice'' ehanged the ovvnership of the solntionB
from the plaintiff to the appellant is charaderized '' aB
'cute', m; 'tricky', a piece of legal legerdemain, as the
annals of the law disclose.'' It was the ar,gument and
not the arguer who waR referred to as ''cute''; and after
reading the argument of appellant in its brief in which
the original argument is hut repeated, we still think our
eharacterizati-on accurate.
WHAT WAS THE LEGAL EFFECT OF THE STIPULATION AND
THE ORDEH OF THE COURT PERMITTING PLAINTIFF
TO

OCCUPY

TRACTS

A,

B,

C, AND D

IN

JUNE, 1928

"WITHOUT PREJUDICE" AND ''PENDING THE ACTION?"

Plaintiff does not get down to discussion of the legal
effect of the stipulation and the order of court permitting plaintiff to occupy Tracts A, B, C, and D in June,
1928, hut confines itself to repetitions pronouncements.
Listen to the following pontifications taken from pp. 79
and 80 of plaintiff's brief:
"'l1 i tlc to such water while .in plaintiff's dump
before proeesses of nature have converted it into
the valuable copper solution that defendants so
much desire, is in plaintiff, and afteT these natural processes have converted ihe water, the
property of plaintiff, into a thing of value in the
form of a <:opper solution, by lea(•hing out all<l
carrying in such solution the valuable copper
in plaintiff's dump, also the property of plaintiff, the solution continues to be and is plaintiff's
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property. This copper solution is an artificial
product composed of ingredients all of which are
the property of plaintiff. That solution is a defiuite, defiuaible and identified substance from a
kuowu source, the property of plaintiff, and as
it falls npou the surface beneath the dump,
triekles, seeps and fiows on and above bedrock in
the bottom of the g·ulch over the channel plaintiff
has condemned across defendant's property, it is
still such definable, identified substance, traceablP
and traced from snell known 8oun·e whprein it
was tlw propert_,~ of plaintiff, wherein the copper was the property of plaintiff, a-dmitted to be
such by defendants, the product of plaintiff's
industry, mined by plaintiff, trausported and dPposited upon that dump by plaintiff aml now as
plaintiff's property colleded by plaintiff i11 its
intakr~ and r·onve~'C'd awa)~ to plaintiff's pn•cipitatiug plant, ~where thP copper tlwrein contained,
plaintiff's propNty, derived from plaintiff's
dnmps, is l>C'illg pn•sc1Tl'd for plaintiff, it;-; 0\\'11er. ''
'l'hr• foregoing declaration is introduced 011 pp. 78
aud /!J by the statement that '"l'hese copper solution8
while in plaintiff's dump arc the personal property of
the plaintiff, the v<'n' corpus of whi(•ll plaintiff owns"
(p. 78); awl "Their c•harad<'r is tmchangcd'' (on Trnd

D), "the personal property of the plaintiff alwa.vs idcutifiecl, never abawlonP<l awl lJCVP1' han• the)~ bec•om(• true
percolati11g watns." (p. 78). Befon• tlw statl~ml•nt that
copper solntioils an• personal rn·opert~·, tht> plaintiff
quotes 011 pp. 78-~l of its 'brief a hrief part of a seutenee
from Utal1 Copper Compau~~ v. Mo11taua-Bingham Consolidated Mining Co., (i!J Utah, at pp. 4:30-4:31, i11 whieh
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the court :says that in that ea:se the waters carrying copper ''so long as they are in the dump and considered
part of it,

'

o)

are like the dump itself, the property

of the plaintiff; that it is as lawful for the plaintiff, so
long as tlw waters are in the dump, to collect and remove them as it is to remoYc the Jump itself;

'

'x'

*"

It should be retnt•m'bered, however, that in the <~ase referred to hy agTel•ment beh,·eell trw parties the dump
never became a part of the fee, an<l the whole theory of
th<' Mo11tana-Bingham rase is that by agreement between
the parties the owner of the dump reserved the right to
t'l•mon~ the dump awl therefore the water itself part of
till' dump as against the owner of the fee. It is familiar
law that parties may by agreement prevent what would
ot l!enrise bccotnc attaehml to the real property and
t hPreh_,. bceonw n~al property and so rontinue its cha racter of personal propert_,.. It may, therefore, be true that
in the l\loniatta-Biugham ease neither the immense dump
nor the eoppcr solntiotls <'ontained therein became real
property, though thP conrt doe;.; not so expressly hold,
aml cotmsd has cited no other authority for its suggestion that the copper solutions in the dump in this
case are pen;onal property. Ou the other hand, as distinguished au anthor as \\'iel in his highly regarde<l work
011 "~Wakr Rights", (:3d !~d.) at p. :m, sa~·s that until
water is taken into a rec•pptacle awl there adually eonfined, it is not severed from the laud itself and nuder
the old holdi11gs which support the "cujus est solum
cloctrillc" iu its entiret~· is regarded as a part of the
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land and as real property. Plaintiff has not enlightened
us and has eited no authority at all derogating from the
authorities cited by us in our original brief that property in water is of peculiar character, and ownership
consists in the possibility of capture while in or on the
land of the ownet· with the right to exclude a trespasser.
See \Viel, Sec. i34 and 35.
Wiel, in Sec. i35, states the doctrine as follows:
"'The analogy to animals ferae naturae is
finally shown by the authorities esta;blishing that
water reduced to possession is personal property. Just as wild animals, by capture becoming
private property, are personalty, so likewise running- water, severed from its natural wandering,
and confined under private control in a reservoir,
or other works of man tha,t reduce it to possession, is also personal property.
''The individual particles of water so impressed by diversion into an artificial strneture
or waterworks that confine it, and become priva.te
property, possess none of the characteristics of
immovability that go with ideas of real estate;
they are still always moving though privately
possessed, having, as particles, the characteristica
of personal] property.''
The author cites, among other cases, Bear Lake &
River Waterworks & Irr. Co. v. Ogden City, 3i3 Pac. 1:35,
where the court says at p. 136:
"Water flowing in a natural stream or in a
ditch is not subject to ownership, so far as the
eorpus of the water is concerned. The right to
use it is a hereditament appurtenant to land. This
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is the right that is exempt from taxation in cases
where the land to which it is appurtenant is subject to taxation. But water in the pipes of a distributing system is personal property.
The
ownership is in the water itself. It was, at commoll law, the subject of larceny, and it is not appurtenant to any land.''
\Vhile the foregoing statement 1s made with reference to watL•r l'lowiug i11 a stn~am, we know of no distinction between flowing and pereolating watm· as far
as a ehange from real to personal propert~· is concerned.
"l'~LESS

PLAil\?l'lFF IS PERMI'l'TED TO RECOVER ITS

PROPERTY AS PLAINTIFF PROPOSES, PLAINTIFF'S
COPPEit SOLUTIONS WILL'' BE LOST.

On p. 91 of plaintiff's hrief plaintiff sa:vs: "Unless
plaintiff lw pennittt>tl to RE(~OVER its property as
plaintiff proposes, plaintiff's eopper solutions will flow
thence Oil down into Bingham Creek and to waste, or
into the possession of others who, like the defendants in
this cas<•, neither own them nor haye any right, title or
interest in them.''
think plaintiff has nu<·omwiousl~· indi<'ated the
weakness of plaintiff's case by plaintiff's pleadings and
cNtain parts of plaintiff's brief, notieeahly hy the foregoiug quotation. In plaintiff's <·omplaint (para. 1:~, Ab.
12) plaintiff alleges: "ln order, also, to collect such
waters containing Raid eopper in solution as aforesaid,
and to cna,ble the same to be <·ondueted through said pipe
lines to such preeipitating vats or tanks, it is neeessary
\\" P
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and essential to excavate and construct tunnels and short
branches therefrom beneath the surface of a portion of
the properties and premises of said defendants above
named; and to utilize as a conduit for the purpose of conducting the said waters holding copper in solution and
percolating through the said dump or deposit of ores
so as aforesaid deposited and pla:ced upon the surface
of the property anll mining elaims of this plaintiff in
Dixon Gulch, that portion of the said Dixon Gulch, extending across a portion of the Haid property of said
defendants'' etc. In other words, after the solutions in
plaintiff's dump leave the dump and leave plaintiff's
property, plaintiff cannot get them unless it gets them
on defendant's ground. But it is a misnomer in law to
say that the solutions are owned by the plaintiff when
they reach defendant's premises. There they are owned
by the defendants, and this is an action the purpose of
which is to acquire title to copper solutions which the
plaintiff does not own and has absolutely no right to
capture or control in defendant's premises.
Plaintiff realizes the force of the art,'llment that
m order for it to aequire title it must eapture, control,
and confine water. For this reason plaintiff attempted
in its first proposed findings of fact to induee the court
to find as a matter .of faet that the dump was a reservoir
or a reeeptacle. This the court declined to do. Plaintiff
then attempted to get the court to bring the railroad
dump within the Montana-Bingham case by holding that
the railroad company had a right to remove the railroad
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fill and that :,;ince the railroad company had given to the
plaintiff the right to use the railroad fill for all purposes,
the plaintiff could remove the copper :,;olutions from the
railroad fill at the toe of the fill. But the court held that
the rights of the railroad company in its right of way
over the land owned by the plaintiff was a right of way
for l"trietly railroad purposes,, and that the railroad
could not mine on the right of' way, (rrr. :3714, :3747, 3764;
:HSD) and now plaintiff abandons its original contention
as to what it could take from the railroad eompany adversely to the defendant, and contends that it has by condenmation m·quired the right to colleet and remove waten>, in other words, that condemnation is a substitute
for contract. A eontraet operated in the Montana-Bingham east~, now a eondc~nmation should operate.

'J1Jw books in discussing the nature of water use the
uld desc-riptive words "ferae naturae", wild by natureand all say that water is not finally owned and title not
finally ae<]nired until the water is captured or reduced to
pm;session or eontrol on the analogy of the wild animal
\\'hiclt was not owned until re:,;traint was imposed. Using
this same analogy, suppose that a herd of wild animals
were eonfined within an inclosure the larger part of which
was owned by A and a small converging neck \vas owned
by B, but that the natme of the animal compelled it inevitably to pass from the large tract into the neck owned
hy B. \Vould the law listen a minute to the suggestion
that A should he permitted to acquire the land of B 1 And
if A were to say, "The animal belongs to me anfl not to
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H, therefore l should be permitted to eondemn B 's land",
the purpose of A would be perfectly apparent and equally
nnpermittahle.

'l'he eourt if appealed to would say to

A, "You are mistaken about your ownership of these
animals. 'l'hey arc wild by nature and belong to the one
who first <~aptnres them. If yon do not <·hool'e to capture
tlwm 011 your own ground, you eannot be permitted to
deny to B tlw right to capture them \\·hen they leave
your ground and reaeh the ground of B. 'l'hese animals
hPlong finally a]](] ultimatdy to th<~ Olll' \Yho captures
thPm, and heforr eapture they belong· only in a potential
Hense to the one on whosE~ land tlwy arp at a gin~n timr.
Jf .'·on want the animals, eaptun' them on .vour ground or
\my from B tlw right to capture thl'lll on hi:-; grOlllJ(l."
And suppo:-;e, nndPr sn<"h circnll11-'tall<'l'H mHlcr thl' provisiom; of law whieh permit oeeupation "rwnding the
nction" "withont prejndiee ", A ean oecupy B ':-; gTound
under the claim of A that he owned thl~ animals a1Hl that
B <lid not own the111, and that the law permitted A to acquire the land of H, the <·onrt wen~ to onll'r B to let A
o<~cup~· B 's land, a]](l after the:-;(' animals eamc from .;\ ':-;
land o11to B ':-; laud A wun' io capture them on B 's land,
hut that latur, after revic\Ying the facts and <'Ol!siderillg
the Ia \\', the <·ourt were to :-;ay, ''A, you a rl' wrong; you
neither 0\\'11 thP animaiH 11or have a right io coudenm
B ':-;land." Docs anyone think for a minute that A would
lw pcnnitted to reply, "I may 11ot havl' had a right to
<·ondenm B 'H laud and may not have tlw a!lima]s which
\H'rl' on B's land at the ll10ilJent of <'0!1denmatio11, hut
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having come into possession 'pending the action' 'without
prejudice' to B 's rights of B 's land, I then captured such
animals as <'ame onto B 's land, and because I was in
possession under the order of the court for my purpose
to capture the animals, they belong to me.'' We think
that the argument of A would make little impression
on the court.
'Phe same illustration might be used with reference
to fish in a stream, part of the stream being owned by
B and part heing owned by A, and tlte fish, because of
their nature, or for other reasons, inevitably coming
from that part of the stream owned by A into that part
ownetl by B. \Vould the court be impressed with the
argument of A that he should be permitted to condemn
that part of the .stream owned by B so as to capture
A's fi~h whic•h were A's only if captured on A's part of
the stream and B 's if captured on B 's part of the stream~
We think not.
'l'he same thing would be true about gas. Suppose
A and B owned a gas dome, B the greater part of the
dome antl A only a small part. VI/ ould A be permitted
to condemn B 's part? \\T e think not.
Eaeh particle of water as to suC'h particles of water
at'> came from the dump, and we deny that all of it conws
from the dump, but as to each particle of water as it
seeped and percolated through the dump, the plaintiff
had the rig·ht not of consummated, final title, but the
right to capture and thereby acquire a final title to such
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particle of water; but as eaeh particle of water passed
toward the east such particle finally reached the eastern
boundary of the plaintiffs' land, ami in passing that
boundary, in law it said "goodbye" to the plaintiff and
"how-do-~·ou-do" to tlte owner of the laud into which
it passed. :B'inally as to each particle reaching the western

boundar~·

of the appellant's land, it there greeted the
appellant uot with a frown of alieu hostility, but with

a fair and open and impartial <'onutenance stamped with
the approval of the law, am! said to tltL~ appellant, "l
am yours if you take me." The only event that has
OC('!llTed in the history of tlw eoustantly recmTiug progl'm;s of water from the dmnp (that is, as to such watee
as eomes from the dump) that plaintiff suggests as <-hanging the si tna tion is an order entered on the l:it h of .June,
1 ~J2H, as the appellant always thought, in good faith and
full~· proteeting the right of all the partieH until the
eontJ·on'rsy was fiually deienniiw<l. 'rhe order was Cll·
terL'd ''without prejudice'' based 011 a stipulation ''without projndiee", sigued hy tlw parties by their honorable
rupresentatin:s, pennitting· the plaintiff "pending· the
acti(Jll" to m·<·np_,. laml ow11ed hy the appellaut "without
prejudice>", and there to eolluct waters \Yhi<'h had pn~sed
fnnn the plailltiff's <lump (that is, snell \\·atPr:- as nctunll~· ha<l been iu the dump) and from tlw plaiutiff's
land into the land own<>d b~· the defendant, all<l in so
passing· lind passed from the qualified ownership of thP
plaintiff to tlte qualified owuprship of tlw defendant uud
\\'hieh watt•r was finally cnptured by the plnintiff "with-
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out preju<liet•" on and in the land owrwcl1Jy the appellant
but whieh the plaintiff occupied "pending the action",
''without prejudice". If out of that order it is J)()Rsihk
for the plaintiff to <·reate not a change in title, but, ac<·ording to plaintiff, a 1ncre c<mtinuation of title, notwithstanding there had been no eonsummation of title
by captu1·e of the wah•r in the dump, and notwithstanding
the passage across the boundary separating plaintiff's
ground from itR neighbor, but simply by reason of Uw ordc>r of the <'ourt permitting occupaney of plaintiff's land
until tlw issues of this controvers~· arc determined, aR
the plaintiff <·ontends, \H' <·amwt read the law.
PLAINTIFF IS NOT A

TR~~'SPASSl<JR

IN OCCUPYING

DEFENDANT'S PRIDMISE8 BUT
IS A TRUSTEE.

Plaintiff says that tlw onll'r of tht> <·.ourt removed
th<' han of trespasr,wr a.~ainst plaintiff iu occupying
'Tra<'is C and D. \\' e agree: hut it did not rhang-c title
to Tracts C alJ(l D, uor to the waters fiowing into Trarts
(' all(l D. Plaintiff <·cased to he a trespasser and it bcealll<' a trust<'<' in duty hound to ac<·onnt Oll final deterllliwdiou agaiust its contention to the appellant for its
a<'ts \\·hilc in posRession "pewling the adion", "without
prejndict>". Plai11tiff will admit that it <'ould not lwve
<'rossed tlw \\'CRtE~ru houll<lar.'· of dcfell<lant's land before
the onler of <'ourt permitting temporary possession and
hnH' captured the waten; ftowing in app<>llant 's lall<l without being n trespassur, and we think it is just as clear
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that plaintiff \\'ould not only have been a trespasser, but
after it had taken the water flowing from Tract D, it
would have been a thief. Plaintiff claims that the result
was in some way modified by the order of the court, but
plaintiff dare not come down out of nebulous generalities and arg-ue thil:' matter out as a matter of common
sense and authority. It is a very easy thing to say ''we
are the owners'' in this situation, but it is a very difficult
thing for plaintiff to put its feet squarely on the ground
of authority an(l the law.
Weil, Section 37, has this to say about the matter:

"E:SCAPED OR ABANDONED W ATERIThe water taken into an artificial structure and
reduced to possession is private property during
the period of possession. vVhen possession of the
actual water or corpus has been relinquished or
lost, by overflow or discharge after use, property
in it ceases; the water becomes again no body's
property and re-enters the negative eommunity,
or 'belongs to the public,' just as it was before
being taken into the ditch. It has no earmarks
to enable its former possessor to follow it and
say it is his. The specific water so discharged
or escaped is abandoned; not an abandonment
of a water-right, hut an abandonment of specific
portions of water, y}z., the very particles that are
diseharged or have escaped from control."
~F'or

fear it :-;hould he suggested that while the foregoing is true as to running water it would not be true as
to an undergrouud stream or as to percolating water,
hut which suggestion would not he true under the mooern
doctrine, See Weil, Seetiou 1100, under the title "NO
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l_;O?\GER
srrATg_,,

PRIVATF~

PROPgR'l'Y IN ITS NArrUR1AL

In tlw eourt below plaintiff argued that by reason
of an arrangement it had with the railroad company
plaintiff could. "convey" water through the railroad fill
withont losing title, and since the railroad company could
remove the railroad fill at its own will, it could give to
1lw plaintiff the right to remove the water in the till, an
attempt being mad<~, apparent!~·, to g·et \Yithin the do('trine of the Montana-Bingham Y. LTtnh Copper case. This
th<•o!·~· l!a~ disappeared in the progress of this case from
tht> trial r·onrt to the appellate court, and it emerges in
<lll attPnual<>rl and undefinud assertion without an~· refl'I'l'IJr·p to tilt> record wlwtever, that the railroad eompany
o<·cnpies "t>xclnf<iYely" tlw land OYer which it has an
('<I Sl~llll'nt 1>~· eondenllln ti on or eon trar·t.
'rh iH assertion
that tl1C' railroad's right of way is one of "pxelusive"
f'hnrad<•r is n•pL•ated at several places in plaintiff's
brief. "\gai11 plaintiff f'ites no anthority m support of
its dt>f'laration that the use h~· the railroarl of the right
of wa~· is t~x<·lnsi\'e. '!'here is 110 such anthorit~·. On the
r·ontn\I'Y, tlw auth01·it)· is that a 1·ight of \VIl)' is not
exdusin• as agninst th(• own<•r i11 fe<• as to any use whieh
dol'S 11ot interf<·n~ with the railroad':,; usp for railroad
purpmws, all(f particularly that a right of way gives to
thP railroad 110 mi11ing rights. The railroad <'annot ('Onfer upo11 tlw plaintiff '''hat it does not possess aml cannot
rleprin• the appellant of what the appellant retains, that
is, all mining rights in th0 right of way including the
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right of way as modified or changed in confirmation by
the railroad fill.
Plaintiff has not ventured to discuss any of the
decisive considerations surrounding the securing of possession of the defendant's land by the plaintiff by virtue
of the stipulation and order of the court in the condem-nation proceeding. No discussion or citation of authority
it attempted with regard to the nature and limitations
of the plaintiff's rights in the copper solutions while they
were in the dump and the points made by appellant i11
its brief that the title to the water is a mere limited title,
the right to capture and exclude others from capturing
\\"hile in the dump; that this limited title is lost when
the water passes from the plaintiff's premises and a
similar qualified title vests in the appellant; that while
the appellant lllay not compel the plaintiff to continue
to permit its waters to escape into the land of the appellant, the plaintiff may not follow sueh waters; and
that when such waters are captured in the land of the
appellant there is a final, consummated title in the appellant.
The only suggestion of an explanation of the basis
of plaintiff'8 contention that the waters captured by
plaintiff iu catchment C since plaintiff went in to posse:,;sion "pending the action" and "without prejudice"
on .T nne 1:1, 1928, is that plaintiff by the order permitting
octnpation was not a trespasser in such occupation. It
is true that plaintiff ·was not a trespasser after the order
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of .Jm1e 1iHil, 1928, but plaintiff beemne a tt·ustee for
the appellant in ease it was found at the end of the path
we are pursuing that the plaintiff could not condemn
Trads A, B, C, and D.
\Y e will be aided in reaching a conclusion as to the
character and rights incident to plaintiff's occupation
of appellant's ground by considering what would have
been the effect had their been no order of occupancy.
\V e suppose there ('all he no doubt that if there had been

no onler of occupHIH'Y the appellant could have collected
the coppe1· solutions iu Trad C aml in so doing would
han~ omwd them absolutely. It would have helped con>"iderahly if plaintiff had diseussed this point and have
<·mweded it on the appeal as plaintiff ditl on the trial,
so that ,,.e are able to say without an order of occupation, "pending the action'' and "without prejudice",
plaintiff \Yas the owner of the copper solutions seeping
and !io\Ying i11 'rnwt D and captured iu the catchment
011 Tract C.
Plaintiff has not attewpted to meet our
citations on pp. 91, 92 aud 9~~ that the words "-,vithout
prejudice" mean that the thing done" without prejudice"
is as tlwngh it had uever been dcme. Iu the present case
ueither the faet of the entry of the stipulation, the order
of oecupaw·y "pending the actiou" and ''without prejudice", nor the actual oceupancy of the plaintiff, has any
place whatever in the determination of whether or not the
appellant is the o\\"ner of the eopper solutions seeping nn<l
flo\\'ing ill Tract D. If the entry of the order "without
prejudiee" nnd "pending the action" is given any ef-
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feet whatever in changing title and ownership to the
('opper solutions, in tlw degree that it is g-iven cffed,
there is a departure from the Rtipulation and order that

it should he "without prejudic(' ". If tlw onlL•r is withont prejndi(•e then the oecnpatio11 is without prejudi{·e,
and if the occupation is without prejudice, it necessarily
follows that whoever was tlw owner p1·ior to thl' order
[LlHl the O('CUJHmcy i8 now tlH· owner; thert• has only heen
a chanp;c• i11 thP person

c·ollc~ding·

the solutions, not in the

O\\·nership of tltetll: thP ehange being one "without prejudiec" and only "pending· tlw action"; and whether
or not tlw plaintiiT lllllst pa:· for thL•

('OJ>JH'l"

solutionR

it has been colle(·ting· fro111 Tra(·t D will depend upon
whether or not the appellant waR thL• owner heforp the
0rder of oecupaney and the1·efore coutiuued to be thereafter; and if for

<lit~·

J"t•ason the eollrt penuits thL• (·on-

delllnation of 'l'raets .A, B, C, and D i11 twnnitting

(~OJI

demuation the (•ourt will require that the appl'llant lw
paid for en•ry elutlle!lt of nlJm• ill t!Jl'SC' tracts iu(·luding
Hll.'' wntL•rs tH•n·olating or flowi11g in th<· trads.
Plaintiff, as it seems to appellant, fails to appreeiate
the fad that if

~'ou

take land in whieh th(•re is pl•n·olating-

water :·on 11mst P'ay for the preeolating water.
han• stntecl

nmn~·

As wc>

times i11 this case, it iR our eontentiou

1hat the appellant's prmnisl'S cauuot he condl'llllJC(l be(•;mse snch ('Ondemnn ti on would mean that the right of

the defendants to llline on their

O\Yll pn~tnises

would he

transferre<l to thL• plaint iff, alJ(l the statutes of e111inent
domain eon1emplate no sueh reslllt.

On the other hand,
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we are clearly of the opinion that .if the plaintiff may
eondemn the defendant's premises, in doing so it must
pay for the valualble per·colating, seeping and flowing
eopper solutions therein.
Plaintiff has cited the case of Los Angeles v. Pomeroy, 124 Cal. 597, 57 Pae. 585, in which it was held that
the underground waters of an entire valley were a reservoir and that since the waters moved in a certain direction, they constituted a subterranean stream throughout
the entire valley. \Ve will refer to this ease again, hut
at the present time let us rely on the case for onr proposition that in condemning land you must pay for all of
the water seeping, percolating aml flowing .in it. The
eourt in this case approve<l the following instruetiou:
"You are instrueted that, in addition to these
rights aud benefits arising from the flow of the
river through this land, the defendants are the
absolute owners of all sueh water as may he present in the :-:oil of this land, and which does not
con:stitute a part of the water of the river. This
is usually called 'pereolating water.' There is,
however, no magic in the word 'percolating'; and
the faet that any witness may apply that word, or
refuse to apply it, to any particular class of waters of which he may speak, is not <~onelnsive of
the question whether or not such water does or
does not form part of the river. That question
is to be determined bv von from a consideratim1
of the fach; proven. ·· The right and ownership
of the defendants in this elass of water:-: is distinct from, and much greater than, their right to
the waters of the stream. As to the \\"atcrs of
the stream, they have a right only to the use of
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it on this land, and they do not own its corpus,
or its body, or the very water itself; and they have
no right to take it away from the land and use it
on other lands, or to sell or dispose of it for use
on other lands or at other places. But as to this
other \\·atcr, if any thc>re is in this land, not a
ymrt of the stream, they are the absolute owners
of it, to the same extent and as full)· as they
own the soil or the roeks or timber on the land.
Therefore, if hy any means they can separate this
water from the laml, the)· have an absolute right
to the water thus separated, and may conduct it
a\Yay and sell or disposc> of it anywhere as they
see fit, suhjeet only to the limitation that the~· may
not excavah• or do anything on the lan<l for the
mere purpose of intercepting sneh water, ami preventing same from flowing into the Rtream or water course on the land of another, a}](l without
inteudinp; to make an~· ht>IWfi<·ial use of it them:o;elves. 'Vhatc>ver additional 111arkd valnP this
land may have had by reasou of tlw presence
t,herein of watt~r of this c·lass, or h.'· rPason of
the feasibility of separating it frotH tlw lan<l, or
of using it on the land, or of eonducting it to somP
other plaep for use or sHIP, or of the gTl'at market
val up of snc h wn tl•r for t-mch purpm;cs, or h~· reaROll of all thm.:p thing-s eomhiued, or hy renSOIJ of any other lawful benefit or a<lvantag·e whi(·h
this water g·ives, this additional market value inuref' to the benefit of the rlefen<lants, and is a
part of the compensation to whieh the~· are entitled in this eaRe, as the vahw of the land to he
<-ondemned.
"You are instrnde<l that, if the jnr~v heliC'Yl'
front the evidenee that the subterranean waters
in the land sought to he eondeumed are percolating·
withont any <lefinit<' ehannel, and that the same
are not a suhtenanean water conrsc> or stream;
aml if thc>~· believe that sn('lt watc•rs eome onto

I I

said lauds from the lands of others above, or pass
from tlw lands sought to be condemned down to
the lands of others lying below, and that snch lrpper proprietors could, by the construction of tunnels or other works, cut off or divert said watei's,
or some part thereof, from the lands sought to
he condemned, or that such lower proprietors
could construet tunnels or other works on the
lands lying helm\' the lands sought to be condemned, which would have the effect of draining or (lerniving the lands songht to be condemned of their
subterranean waters, to the extent that the owners
of the land sought to he condemned eoultl not
make a praetieal usp thereof, or of some part of
said waters-then the jnry are instrueted that
such upper and lower proprietors would have the
same rights so to appropriate saicl waters ou
their lands as the rlefendants would have ou the
lands sought to be condemned; and the jury must
take those faets into consideration so far as thev
diminish or destroy the value of the rights of th.c
defendants to said waters, or such portion thereof
as f'ould be so cliYerted or drained so as to Cleprive clefPntlants of the practical use thereof."

lt will be noticed that in eomlemniug a piece of land
and taking watt>I'S sec•ping-, percolatiug and flowing therein the f'ourt iu the Lns Angdes-Pomero~- ease requires
that the eo11deumor shall pay for the r·apal'it~- of the
land to produce tNifer, aud it will further be noted that
this capacity is not limiterl to thP watl'r in the laud at
tlw inRtaiWl' of condenmatiou, hut the eondenmor was
requirerl to pay for the \rat(•r whieh would come into the
land in the fnbn·e, Rnbjeet to the possibility which limited
tlw value of the water right in tlw owner of the land and
thP amount which the condemnor was therefore required
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to pay for that water right by the fact that the owner
of the dominant estate was free to cut off the flow of
tl1e water (if percolating) at any time and deprive the
servient estate, which was condemned, of the continued
flow. lt will be noted, therefore, in the present case that
if plaintiff is permitted to condemn Tract D and the waters seeping, pereola ting and flowing therein, the plaintiff \Yill condemn the water producing capacity of this
ground whieh included the right in the appellant to all
waters \\~hich should f1ow, seep and percolate from the
lands of the plaintiff into the lands of the appellant. Of
course the plaintiff could cut this water off by capturing
it on its own premises and by preventing its escape, but
the ownership of all water flowing from the land of the
plaintiff and into the land of the defendant ceased, in
crossing the boundary between the land of the plaintiff
and the land of the appellant to belong to the plaintiff
and beeome the water of the appellant, and must be paid
for. As a matter of fact, this, as plaintiff says, "intere,sting case" of Los Angeles v. Pomeroy clearly states
the doctrine that in condemning a piece of land one must
not only pay for the water in the land at the instance
of condemnatiou hut must pay for the likely or possible
particle of water-it may he hundreds of miles away,
or it may be at that time in the douds, or it may he at
that time in the gulf stream-which in the eourse of time
will reach the laud in question and, in reaehing such
land, he suhjeet to capture. So in the instant case, the
plaintiff in condemning tract D must pay the appellant
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for the copper solutions seeping, pet'colating and flowing
in plaintiff's dump which, unless captured and controlled
011 plaintiif's land, will etwape into the land of appella11l

It would have been "interesting" for the City of Lo;:; Angeles to have informed
Pomeroy and his assoeiates that in eondelllning its land

and Le owned by appelhwt.

all Los Angeles would have to

pa~'

was for the laud a11d
no watet·, that tlw water which would comP iHlo the lund
in the future would belong to the City of Lo;,; Angeles
bt><·ausc Los Angeles would not be a trespasser npon the
land it had

a<~quired

front Pomeroy.

\\" e are dealing with old and fundamental principles
iu this cas<'. 'l'he law rPlating to water is not the

c·n~ature

of' our day lJut of many generations, and its principles
haYe hee11 tested and applied under varying eirenmstances and found to work out i11 the long nm, C'verything considered, the fnin,st and most equitable re<'Of,>nitiou of rights, and such s_•;stmu cannot he <list urhed or
sPt asi ck lw('a us<• of the whims or supposed interests
of a larg-e 1nining ('OHC<'nl as against a fc\V individuals.

\\"hat we gl't out of the case of Los Angeles ,._ Pomeroy
is that you l'annot takl' tlw watl'r sel~ping, pl'r<·olating
or Jlo\\'ing i11 tlw land of mwther b_,. comll~lllllation pro<'l•edings wtiless ;I} Oil pay for them, and that is all that we
<·au ask hPI"l' if the <'ourt rea<'ltes the ('Ollclusiou that thi·s
la]}(l may he <'ondPimwd.

'l'!Jp logic of the plaintiff 111 this ease would work
out in a rather discou<'ert.ing wa~' if it wen' applied to
a valley i11 which there was sitnaterl six different mining
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concerns ownmg mmmg dumps producing copper solutions at different elevations, the highest being owned
by A and the lowest being owned by F. E would institute
proeeedings to condemn the land of F so as to collect its
copper solutions on the land of 1<--.. Having succeeded
and thereby educated its neighbor D, situate at a higher
level, D would bring an action to condemn the lands of
E, which would include those of !<~. Having succeeded,
C would institute a similar action acquiring the lands of
D, E, and F. B would follo\\·, and finally A, having the
land al the highest elevation, would become the owner of
the lands of C, D, E, and F; and in so doing they would
c~ach in turn make the same argument as plaintiff makes
in this case, that all they were acquiring wa,s a ditch,
ancl that having acquired possession by the preliminary
order '' wi tlwut preju< lice'', ''pen <ling the action'', the
copper solutioni:i which eame into the servient tenement
thereafter were ''conducted'', '' eonveyed' ', ''carried''
by them onto such servient tenement, ancl having possession of the servient tenement, they were not trespassers, and not being trespassers, would have entire
right, not by agreement with the owner of the servient
tcmement, hut by eonclemnatiou, as plaintiff in this case
says in order to hring plaintiff's rights within its interpretation of the ~fontana-Bingham case, to collect the
1n1ters in question.
On pp. 102 and 1 o:) of our brief we discuss the use
of the words "convey", "carry", and "take" used by
the plaintiff in <lescrihing the movement of sueh part
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of the water as comes from plaintiff's dump to the intake at catchment C and suggested that plaintiff was
arrogating to itself too much in the use of these words
since they imply some control of the waters on the part
of the plaintiff, while the facts demonstrate that the
only agency at all concerned is the law of g-ravitation
which plaintiff unconsciously is attempting to condemn
in this action. The water in question falls like the gentle
dew from heaven upon the earth beneath, \Vhich happens
in this ca'se to be the dump of the plaintiff, but the falling is no different than if the property were otherwise,
and then seeps, percolates, and, perhaps, flows through
t lle tlump into the soils beneath the dump, and seeps,
percolates, and, perhaps, flows through and out of the
ftll. Some of it perhaps reaches the bottom of the gulch
and all of it rises in the toe of the dump on Tract D. How
in the name of heaven can this progress be called a "conveying" or "carrying" or "taking" of the water by
the plaintiff from the dump to the eatehment, rrract D"?
The only reason why these words are used is that they
imply some control of the water by the plaintiff, and
plaintiff realizes that to perfect its title it must have
captured, reduced to possession, and controlled this water on its own premises. It is for this reason that plaintiff toys with words which imply the capacity of the
plaintiff to "earry'', "convey", and "take" such part
of the water as comes from the dump to the catchment
from the plainti 1I 's land to the land of the defendant.
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Again plaintiff's use of these words is poetical and has
no existence in reality.
UTAH COPPER CO. V. MONTANA-BINGHAM CONSOLIDATED
MINING CO .• 69 UTAH 423, 255 PAC. 678.

Plaintiff argues that the basis of the holding in the
~\I on tan a- Bingham

case b.v the State Court is that the

lltah Copper Company waH not a trespa,;ser on the dump
<nHi

therefore ha<l the right to take the water in the

dump. 'I' his is not the baH is of the eourt 's deeision. The
basi,; of the <·ourt ',; deci,;io11 is that hy agreement the
Utah CoppPr Comrmu)· wa,; the owner of thP dump ~with
the express ri.qht to remoYe till' dUJilp and could thNcforc remove eYerything in the• dump. 'Vhile plaintiff
\Hli:' not a trespasser it was something mon• than "not
a trespasser". Plaintiff had the express right to re~
move the dnmp, in other words, it was the owner of the
clnmp, and the solntiom; being a part of the dump, was
the owner of the solutions.
MONTANA CONSOLIDATED MINING CO. V. UTAH COPPER
CO., DECREID OJ<' JUDGE .JOHNSOl\.

ln a se<~ond Montana-Bingh:uu-l)tah Copper cas<'
:filed iu the Federal Comt, w:hi<'h is discussc•d b~· plaintiff ou pp. GH aml 70, the Federal Court at tempterl a de<'ree interpn•tivl' of tlw decision by the fitate Court. 'rhe
J1'e<1eral Conrt has not explained the hasi:-; of its decision
aud ma~- well have held that sin<'e the rig-ht to remove
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the dump existed, this included the right to remove the
copper solutions on and in the easement.

\V e do not

know why the court held that the Copper Company could
follow the solutions into the soils and onto betlrock nuder
the dump, but we surmise that it was because the court
felt that the right to remove the dump <'arried with it
the right of doing everything necessary to make that
removal effectual and beneiieial. In any event, the
rights \\·ere based on agreement between the owner of
the dump with the right of removal and the owner of the
servient estate burdened with the duty of permitting
the remon1l. But all of the comfort which plaintiff may
he able to get ont of the Federal ease stops :,;hort of
any aid in the ea;se now before the court, for the decree
in the Federal C'ase expressly ends all elaim, ownership,
or right in the plaintiff to tl1e coppl~r solutions when "the
same shall have flowed out and seeped and percolated iu
and through the soil on the plaintiff's mining elaims,
laterally bt~yond the periphery of sai<l dump or deposit
and off of and from the surface right, interest and estate
heretofore conveyed to defendant"; and in another plal.'e
in the decree "the right eontinue:,; until" (awl then ench;)
''when the copper solutions shall have flowed out and
seepecl or percolated iu aml through the soil of the plaintiff's mining claims (Montana-Bingham Company) laterally beyond the periphery of said dump or deposit and
off of and from said surface right, interest and estate of
the defemlant" (Utah Copper Company). On page 71,
after quoting from the Federal Montana-Bingham ea.:Se
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and then from the opinion in the State case, and having
Ptated that the only difference as far as plaintiff can
Hee is that "in the case at bar the two estates are laterally
cont iguom; ", while in the Tiewaukee case the dump was
superimposed upon the claims of the ltliniug company,
plaintiff asks, \Yhat is the differenee t

~We

are more

interested, however, in the fnc·t that plaintiff has cited
the

Fedl~ral

case as in some way sustaining its position

here, uotwithstanding tlw fac·t, which plaiutiff has not
n•fc•ned to nor attempted to explain iu any degree, that
tlw eonl'i in the ]<'edernl c·asl• in n denee prepared and
Sll'hmitted to the court hy the plaintiff aetua1l,\·, expl'C'ssly,
h\·iC'e, fonnd that thl•re was a di ff'en•Iwe, all<l that as soon
as thl• solutions seeped "latentll.'· he.nmd the pe1·iphery
oft-mid dmnp or deposit," tlw title• of the plaiutiff ec•ased
and its right to capture the solutiom; cea:-:ed.

ln:-:tead of

aski11g appellaut to explain the diffen•w·e it :,.;L•ems to
us that it it-> itH'lllllbent npm1 the plainti f'f in <'i tiug this
('ase to attl'lllpt

t->OIIll~ n~couciliatiou

lilllitation of the denee in

tlll'

hetwel'Jl till' expn•ss

rJ'iewaukec• <'HSl' as to

water sN•ping or flowing'' latl~rally he.'·mHl tlw periplH•r.'·
of t->aid dmnp or d<'posit ".

'L'hl• diff'l•n•JWl' hl'twee•n the•

right to collec·t thl• \rater beueath the· dulllp and tlw denial
of tlw right whl'll the water flowed laterally hC>.\'Olld the
dnmp is, at-> it :,.;eetns to us, perfect!.'· oln·ious.

The <·otut

hl'ld thai by agreellll'nt the plaintiff in thl• 'l'iPwtmkee
<'HSl~

i11 the

Fe~deral

Court had

snrn~ndered

the right

otlwnvise possessed to colle•ct the coppe•r solutions ill
its OWJl ground beneath tlw dump, hnt that that agree-

rnent did not extend to the solutions seepmg or percolating iu the property of the plaintiff beyond the peri}Jlwry of the dump. It was purely a rnatte1· of agt·eement
and rests upon the sonnd basis that you may agree to
part with what you

OWll.

rrhe question in this

('HSC

is

not what may be done by the owner with what he owns,
whieh was the question in the Tiewankee case, but
whether or not the plaintiff iu this case adually owns
wlwt tlw .Montana-Bingham Compauy was expressly deen~ed to own iu the Tiewnnk<~t· case, tltat is, all copper
solutiom; pl·n·olating, seeping or flowing in its property

to ,,·hich it has not
Ieudered its rights.

volm1taril~·

and hy ag-reement sur-

Ou page 71, after refening to the

11ontana-Biugham ease, aud noting that the copper solutious whi<·h the ( 'opper Company was permitted to
follow all(! cnptun• were those iu and bt>neath the dump,
hut in this case are lat<>rally by hundreds of feet from
th<• dump, plai11tiff says: "But what do theRe <lefendmits think this wit is for!

Not being able to acquire

h)· <'OIItrad the right to convt•y these solutions over and
upon the prelllist•s of tht> defendant, plaintiff found it
lle<·e:-;sa ry to institute this suit b.'· whi<·h to condemn that
right, alHl, pursuant to the order of eourt entered into
po:-;scssiou of that part of tlw defendants' premises required for that purpost>, all(! Pxereising the rig-ht so eonft>nt>d

lliJOll

J!laintiff iu and

ll)JOU

those premises, plain-

tiff pro<"eedl'd to aud has at all times since umh~r that
rigbt, comTeyed its <·opper solutions from its dumps down
to its intake."

The foregoing statement is a mass of
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twisted perversiOns.

In the first place, we deny that

the plaintiff ever attempted ''to acquire by contract
the right to convey these solutions over and upon the
premises of the defendant".

The plaintiff never sought

to convey the solutions over the premises of the defendants. If phiintiff had attempted to seeure a eontraet to
convey its solutions over the promises of the defendants,
there is no doubt but that it could have seeured such :=t.
contmct. But, be it remembered, conveying implies control, and powerful as the plaintiff thinks it is, it does
not convey by simply permitting the law of gravitation
to exert its influence. Conveying implies control and
posisession, and the only way in which the plaintiff could
have conveyed solutions over the land and premises
would have been to have eaptured on its own land solutions in its clump and by some means whieh woul(l have
confined such solutions and not permitted them to esc·ape,
such as by means of a pipe line have taken them acro•ss
appe11ant's premises. Appellant would never have objected to this; but plaintiff has never attempted to secure
such a right. It is, we think, for the same reason, a
perversion for plaintiff to suggest that because of the
refusal of defendant, plaintiff ''found it necessary to institute this suit by whieh to condemn that right" (right
to convey water a·cross defendant's premises); and it is
also who11y inaceurato to state that plaintiff "pursuant
to the order of tho court entered into possession of that
part of defendants' premi,sos required for that purpose".
What the plaintiff is doing is capturing on defendant's
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l<md defendant's copper solutions. They have never
ht>en redu(~ed to possession by the plaintiff at any other
phwc than 011 the land of the defendant where they are
ownt>d by defendant; and these waters have been permitted to escape from plaintiff's dump just as truly since
the order of the court as prior thereto. 'rlw last statement that since the oi,der of the court plaintiff has "proceeded to ami has at all times since under that right,
('OnYeyed its copper solutions from its dumps down to
its intalw ", ignores the conditional, tentative, preliruinmy (•ha rader of the O('(~upalH~Y of defenda11t 's premises
h:· tlw plaintiff "pt>nding the adion" and "without
prejudiCL' ''.
If tilL' plaintiff (lesires to secme the right to capture
copper solutions in the servient estate in this case as it
was pt>nnitted to do in the 'riewauket> ('ase, it must do
as it did in the 'l'iewaukee case, secure that right by
agTeement and pa.'· for it, or, it must do as the plaintiff
clid in thL' "intt>resting <·ase" of Los Angeles v. Pomeroy
-purdmsP that right. WL' join with plaintiff in recom··
1nending the ('ase of Los Angele8 v. Pomero.\· as "interesting" and add that it is instrn('tin•. As we think illu1llinating this Pntin~ qnesti(m, may \H' ask what would
ha n• been tlw result in the 'l'iewaukee ease had the Utah
Copper Compnu.'· in its agreement secured only a right
to dump its wastu material on the land of the MontanaBingham Compan~' '! ~Would not the court have held
nndt>r SU('h cin·mustances that it had ahandont>(l any COll-

per solutions thereafter flowing out of tlw dump, and in
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the present case, having acquired no right by agreement
with the defendants to remove from the lands of the
defendants any ·waters which may have escaped from the
plaintiff's dump at a higher level, will the defendant
be permitted, without paying for them, to take copper
~oiutions from the lands of the defendant vvhen there
can he no doubt that the plaintiff would have had no
rig·ht in the 'riewaukee case to have taken copper solutions from the dump, or, as the Federal Court held, beneath the dump (but not laterally) had the defendant
not by agTeement reserved the right to remove the entire
<lump and all in it 1
It is absolutely certain that unless the copper solutions in plaintiff's dump are actually captured ~md controlled in the dump they will percolate, seep and flow
into Tract D. This certainty is a property right in the
owner of rrract D. This right in the owner of Tract D
is not an absolute right and may be cut off and destroyed
by the plaintiff capturing and controlling the solutions
before they leave the dump, but the plaintiff's right to
the solutions in the dump is confined to the dump, and
the plaintiff has no more right to anticipate the right
of the defendants to the solutions if they are permitted
to escape and flow into Tract D by condenming Tract
D and thus acquiring ownership to the waters even
though they are permitted to escape and flow into Tract
D than the owner of Tract D has to anticipate its ownership by extending a tunnel into plaintiff's dump and
capturing the waters in the dump before they are per-
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mitted to escape.

The plaintiff owns the waters in the

dump; the defendant owns the waters in defendant's
ground.
cape.
escape.

The plaintiff has the right to prevent the es-

'rhe defendant has the right to capture after the
Neither can interfere with the other; and what

the plaintiff is attempting· to do in this l'ase is to de;;troy
the defendant's rights to capture the waters after they
escape, when the only way plaintiff ean preserve its title
is to prevent the cseape. lt is because tlwre is no escape
from the conl'lnsion that if plaintiff is permitted to condeum 'l'ract D or eateh the waters in Tract 0, it will be
mining- the defendant's ground, <·apturiug defendant's
('Opper solutions and depriviug the lldendant of its own
right to miue, that we say thl~ court eannot permit the
condemnation of the trad sought by the plaintiff. While
the foregoing is absolutely true in fact and souml in
law, as we see the law and the fact, the defendant nevertheless says that if the ('Ourt for any reason ean hold that
tlte plaintiff is entitled to condemn the land of the defemlant, it umst pa~· for the eertaiut~· that valuable waters
permitted to escape will reach defendant's lands and
belong to the llcfeudant, and that the plaintiff cannot
eondemn Tract D without paying- for this potential right.
It is the taking of our property without payment for all
of its values, of values fixed and inhering in the land,
those existing in enjoyment now and those which will
accrue in the fntnrc-this valuable possibility that waters
in tho <lump will coutinue to escape from the dump, this
certainty that if it is permitted to escape from the dump
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it will come to 'rraet D, a value just as true and existent
as any other value-it is the failure of plaintiff to pay
for all of these values that vitiates and destroys the
sonndne:-;H of the decision by the trial court.
It sceHls to appellant that the essence of this contrm·ers:· is not ditheult of a:-;<•ertainment. ]j'or many
years water has heen flowing down Dixon Gulch and apJWaring approximat'ely where it now does in the Hays
~]Wing. 'Phis water has had a <·opper eontent for a eonl'iderahh• time. ~incc the dnmp of the plaintiff waH depoHite<l in the upper elevation in Dixon Onleh the coppN
<'mttent has increased and he<·oute commercial. These
<·opper Holutions have flowed and will continue to How
into the lands of the appellant. Whatever part of these
:,;olutions c·omes diredly or iudiredly from plaintiff's
dnrnp plaintiff desin's to eollPci all(] precipitat(•. 'l'hiH
plaintiff may legally do b,\· <·apturing tlwse solutions on
its own property. ff they are captured on plaintiff's
pmpnty they may hP <·om·eycd by ·some meanH not JlPrmitting their PS<'HJH', a pipe, for (•xomple, or a c·onc·rcte
lined ditch, ami we have no doubt that if intereepted,
eolleded and <'Ontrolled on plaintiff's prullliscH, plaintiff
<·<mid, if it did Hot interfere with the rights of the defemlant to c·olle<'t copper waters on defuudant 'H ground,
actually c·onve~· these solutions acrm;s the land owned
by the appellant, or, if possible, thesp solutiollH C'onld be
cliYertect into land not now reeeiving copper solutions
from plaintif'f'H <1ulllp, or otherwise, h~· the plaintiff condenming snC'lt barren and non-prodnctive lands as far as
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<~opper

solutions are eoncerned.

But we think it just

as rertaiu, as a matter of law, that plaintiff may not
eondenm the land:,; into which these copper solutions have
been flowing and will continue to flow unless they are
eontrolled, captured, and Teduced to possession in plaintiff's ground a:,; any other principle of the law relating
to water. What plaintiff is attempting to Jo is to abandon <·ertain waters from its Jump, permit title to arise
in the appellant, allll uotwitbstandiug this chauge in
title, take the title away from the appellant without paying for it. '!'his plaintiff cannot do. \Ye ~;ay "abaudon"
awl "permit to eseape ". The:,;e exprcs::;ions, in our judgment, are uot at•c•m·atP. 'I'Ite~- imply iu some way volition
ou the part of the plaintiff. Ownership and ehange of
ownership of water is in large part involuntary, partienlarly as to subterranL>an uumifestatious. 'l'he layv ereates
the qualified ownership as to water in laud and also erHls
the owuership wheu the water passes from the laud. The
\Yill of the O\Yuer of the lalHl has nothing to do with either
the creation or the cessation of ownership. Such ownership is an incident of forces OYer which the owner of the
land has no control. He doe:'\ not permit water to eseape;
the water simply fto,,-s from the land through the operation of natural forces and flows into the land by the
operation of natural forces, and the mvnership ari;,;es
and ceases by the operation of the same forces. \Y e think
plaintiff fails to appreciate or to give due for·ce to the
uatnre and limitations of ownership of water. 'rhis owncn;lJip exists in the owner of the land o11ly while water
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m the land, and is a qualified ownership until the
water is reduced absolutely to possession. If the water
leaves the land of the owner, his ownership ceases. And
it should not he overlooked that it is of the very essence
of tlw natnre of water that it iR in constant motion and
ehnnge:;; from plaee to place. It is this incident that
gwes to it its essenee and distinctive characteristics
whic·h an~ reeogui:r,ed and have determinative consequen<·es in tiH' lnw relating to the accession and the
1prmiua tion of ownership of water.
IH

IS APPELLANT APPJ<JALING ONLY FROM THE WRITTEN
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE TRIAL COURT'?

Plaintiff <'Olltplaius that \YP have spent a great dt•al
ef time in argning against the writtc•n tnemormHlum
opinim1 of thf> eourt and 11ot against th(• jndgn1ent of the
court (Brief page 74 ). If then• exists any differenc·e
between the judgment and the written memorandum
opinion of the eourt, if tho judgment does not enthod.Y
thP written mmnorandum opinion, it wonld he ver)· ea:;;:·
for plaintiff to point ont this fad. Plaintiff has suggested 110 differe11ce and "·e think then• is 110 nwterial
difference. 'l'lte judglllent embodies the opi11iou. \Ye,
of counw, do not eontend that tlwre iR an:· reversible
error in the opi11ion, hut the opinion is embodied in the
jndgmeut and then• is rcYersible error in the jndg1nent,
and the judgmeJJt is Pxplailled h~, the opinio11 and the
foree and effed of the judgmPnt is illuRtrated hy the
opinio11, and it is quite like!~· that it is lJpeauRe the opin-

93
wn discloses the nature and effect of the judgment
that plaintiff objects to our referring to the opinion.
WHAT IS A DITCH?

It will not escape the attention of the court that
plaintiff haR been compelled to Reek every ec·centric and
queer ease ill the bookR to attr•mpt ;, snpport of its definition of a ditch. 'Plw railroa<l fill iu !his ease was
plaeP<l squarely a<·ross the g-ulch at rig-ht angles to the
channel. It ohstruets in great degree the flow of water
dowll the guleh. 'J1he plaintiff contended that there was
IHon• or less opm1 drain in the progrf'ss of the gulch due
to th<• JH'l'S<'llC<~ of larg<• boulders in the making- of the
fill. The <lefcudant contended that through the aetiou
of flood \\·a(ers the fill was in large part sealed, but in
an.Y t>vent as fo all watt>rs not reaching the absolute bottom of th<> gulch, Uw rail!·oad fill itself served as <l
mPdium !!trough whieh \Ya(<•r:-; front the <lump seeped aml
JH~reolated. lt \Yas for !his rC>ason that the till itself and
e\·et·ythiug ahov<> lwdnwk on 'l'rad ]) is i11cluded within
the area sough! lo IH· l'OIHlenmed. It is n•ry diffienlt, if
not impossi•ble, to com·L•ivL• a gulch across whi<'lt has been
plnf'cd a railroacl fill with thousaml:,; of ton:-; of material
being a "diteh" and the guleh being <·onclemned from
hedroek up through surface soils and through thP fill as
a "dit<-h". As a matter of fact, plaintiff has coutem1Pd
throughout this <'ase for the most fantastieal proposition:-; in the way of <lit<·ltes, reRervoiT':-; and receptadeR.
In the original fimlings of faet as snbmitled by tlw
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plaintiff, plaintiff asked the court to find as a matter of
faet that the dump is a "reservoir" or "receptacle".
This was objected to as being "poetical", and the court
struck it out err. 3802-7). Plaintiff''S proposition amounts
in the eud to a holding that everything through, over, or
along whieh water is conducted by the law of gravitation
is a ditch. The definitions we have quoted in our brief
require that a ditch shall have Home definite boundaries
confining water, such as a reservoir and a receptacle
must have. The only boundaries of the "reservoir"
plaintiff contended for were the blue sky albove and thC>
brown earth beneath, and the 'same unsubstantial chara<·ter attaches to plaintiff's ('Ontention in this cafw J·pgarding a ditch.
The character of the "ditch" contended for by
plaintiff is well illustrated by the testimony of plaintiff's
expert, Joseph J. Beeson (A b. 500-:-n. Mr. Beeson was
being cross-examined with regard to the plty1sieal conditions undemeath the plaintiff's dump at the toe of the
dump and up against the railroad fill and tlw conrsp of
the solutions from that point of capture on defendant's
land in catchment C.

'' Q. "\Vhat have you assumed to Le the condition of the first flume from vonr lower wing
of the upper portal of the drain tunnel, ·what havt~
you assumed to be the eonditimt of that terrain1
A. I have assumed that to Le-I hadn't
really given it very much thought 1wmmse my eonception of the way those solutions, these copper
waters passed through there is that they eneoun-
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ter instead of au impervious seal it is ju:,;t semipervious, that is it simply prevents the flow from
being rapid,. and that the copper water~:-~ will
eventually percolate throug-h it.
Q.

'fhat ts your seal against the toe of the

A.

Yes sll'.

(~.

You think that is

A.

Yes, 1 think it is.

fill 't
semi-pervious~

'rhat the waters percolate downward
that and into the• fill and pereolate out
through the fill until they reaeh the bottom of the
gulch and appc~m down at the 1-la~·s spring, is that
your idea~
Q.

throu~h

A.

That is right.

(~.
Does that extend across the entire upward toe of the fill1

A.

I should think

~:-~o.

(~ .. So that whe11 you Raid it flowed dow11
through the fill, you didn't know of any particular channel in \Yhieh they were coursing down
through the fill, did you~ You have seen no evidrlH'e of that, lwve you?

A. No, not of any partienlar channel except
when it ('OillPH out, wheu l hav<~ ohservl'd it, it
all camP out at onl' place.
(J_ l think you stated those wa terH are seeping and pPrcolating in the fill, in the soil abo,·e the
fill mHl abo\'(' he<l-rock, is that eorre<'t?
A. YeR, that iR right.
(~.
You obsNved the water per<'olation hc•tween hed-roek and the eollar of the raiRe iu the
catehment tunnrl, did you uot, Mr. BeaHon?

nfi

A.

Yes, I think I observed that."

'' Q. Is that the character, the :-;ame general
character of water seepage and percolation you
have described in your evidence~is the way the
water leaves the fill and comes down to the point
where it accumulates for the making of the Hays
spring similar to that appearanc·e that is in the
shaft there or in the raise?
A. Yes, I think it is. I believe there are
places in the bottom of the stream where the
gravel would have a certain amount of mud in
it and force more water to come ont right in the
bed of the stream than others.''
The foregoing! testimony indicates the kind of
"ditch" plain tiff is attempting to condemn. The experiments plaintiff performed in which it took hours for
water to go from the top of the railroad fi]} and from the
dump illustrates the conveying charaeteristics of sucl1 a
"ditch". These experiments are refe.ned to in respondent's brief at pp. 42-4 and are also discm;sc><l in this
brief at pp. 49-51. And see what Mr. PJarl says
,about the course of the waters c·omiug from the plaintiff's dump in his testimony abstracted at pp. ] Hi-Hi of
respondent's brief.
The course Mr. Earl defines
is from anywhere to anywhere, just ,so the waters reach
appellant's land and can be collected in the catchment
on Tract C.
NECESSITY.

Plaintiff Is entitled to very little consideration in
this case on the question of necessity. Mr. Goodrieh
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testified that when the dumps were placed in Dixon
Gulch they were thoroughly familiar with its characteristies and o.f the tendency of these dumps to give off
copper solutions. 'l'hey knew at that time that the Hays
1Spring waters were upon defendants' premises and that
if the dump gave off solutions that they would probably
go down through the gravels and soils beneath the dump,
or seep and percolate throug·h the fill and eomiugle with
these waters. Mr. Goodrich testified fully with reference to this suhjeci mntter (Ab. 1;>1-15:3). He testified
as follows:
'' (~.

At the time you commenced dumping iu

192G you or your company had a thorough knowl-

Pdge and understanding of these dumps and their
eharacter and characteristics with reference to
being reservoirs and sponges for water, all of
them, di<ln 't ~:ou?

A.
(~.

A.

(l.
A.

Yes sir.
Had all of that information'?
Yes sir.
Didn't you 1

Yes sir.
(l. And at that time, Mr. Goodrich, it would
have been a very easy matter, would it not, to
have provided for a catchment at the bottom of
that dump to obtain these waters without controversy or without any question, the waters from
your dump, wouldn't it?
A. No sir, it would not.
Q. It would not'?
A. No sir, it would cost considerable money
to have provided a catch basin.
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tJ. W onldn 't it have been a very simple
matter in the railroad fill in Dickson Gulch b)
have provided a eatchment?
A.

No sir.

(~.

~Why

A.
Q.

Cost too much money.
What would it have eo:,;U

not?

A. Eight or ten thousand dollars.
Q. J<~ight or ten 1housand dollar:,; would not
have been much to catch millions of tons or millions of pounds of <·opper, would it?
A. I don't think that is the way to figure
values. 'l'hat may be the way yon fi.gun• hut that
is not the way 1 figure Yahw."

*
''Q. lf placed in the B. & 0. fi.ll it woulcln 't
have heen a vcr_,. difficult t-;ituation, ~would it, ;-;o
it would be immnue from the shrinking and <'Xpanding operation of these dumps, that ~wouldn't
have been a w~ry diffi<·ult cngim•pring job, would

itT
A. Su<·h n <'Onstru<·tion could llaVl' been put
un<lemeath the Bingham & Garfi<•ld Hailwa~· fill.
Q. What is that!
A. 8uch a construction <·ould havp hl'ell 1mt
underneath the Bingham & Garfield Haihn1~· iill.

(J. And could have ht><'ll plaeec! ven· near
the dump'?
A.
(~.

Yl•s, quite <·lose to the dntup.

vVould have bem1 ver~· l'asy rna Iter, then,
to have takc•n this water down :\larkham Gulch
and collected and rctaim•d all the water that eould
possibly eomc <lo·wn Dickson Gulch from your
dnrnpf
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A. lt would cost money to do it. The most
direct way to seeure the eopper solutions from
the Utah Copper dump is to take them down
Dieksou Gulch as it is now and catch them at the
eat(·h basin at the toe of the dump, take them on
through the pipe line, just as we have plnmwd."

It will therefore be seen that there was uo reas·on
l!l the world why plaintiff should not at that time have
taken the proper preeaution to eateh its solutions at the
toe of its own dump. Sm·<'ly an ex.peuditure of eight or ten
thousand dollars to catc11 hundreds of millions of pounds
of eopper was a slight consideration. Mr. Goodrich
testifies again at pages 15~J-Hi0 of the abstract that for
eight or ten thousand dollars this eatchmeut ean still be
put in. Mr. Crocker, eminent mining engineer, testified
to the same effect a])(l pn's<mted a complete plan for th<>
eatchmeut.
The only a11swer whieh eounsel attempts to make to
this proposition is that Mr. Earl had some doubts upon
the subject matter. Who is Mr. Earl''? He is a m<i·Jte
engineer (not a mining eng·ineer). Mr. Earl was asked
a,bout himself to determine his qualifications to speak
with reference to certain subject matters. He was a
graduate of the L. D. R. High Sehool (rrr. 65) and took
two years of eivil engineering at the University of Utah.
He never took any courses in geology and never made a
substantial study of it. He quit the University of Utah
in 1904. He has done a little reading on leaching and
precipitating· plants, and crl'r. GG) }ws never made any
substantial study of water and water {'OUrses beneath
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the surface, or of rock strata and

their

composition,

worked as helper on a survey party when he got out of
the University, and finally worked himself up to transit
man (Tr. G7); went to work foT the Utah Copper Company in 1907, making surveys for railroad c·onstruetion.
His work \\·a:,; entirely along· th<> line of tmrveying and
about the only time he seems to have got out of it was
when the leaehing· plant was built he seems to have been
pTitced iu charge of that operation, and also eonstructed
two tracks of the railroad through the Bingham yards

('rr. 71 ).

Again at 'l'r. 10:-l-104, liP was askPd this ques-

tion:
"(~.
c~laim to

l take it, Mr. J1Ja rl, s1 nel' ~·ou do not
lw a geologist, as .You havu statPd, and
have made 110 studY of wnt<>r alHl \Yatt>r <'nurses,
you woul(1 not fpe(;·oun·«~ll' qualifipd to giH• m1~·
opinion as to tlw length of time that it would lak<·
wa,ter to percolate from thP Ftah Coprwr dump
down to this eat<'l1-all1
A.

No r;ir.

(~.

~\ssurni11g

that it would and eonw out

and pPrcolah•<l-

·MR. PARS(>NS:
catC'h-all t

MH. HLCII:

\\"h~-

What do yon mean hy
this tumwl \Yith its wing

over there.
A.

No sir, I have not (•ven thought of that,

I ha(1not, 1 haclnot thought about it and 1 haven't
any opinion. 1 C'OUldll 't form an~· opinion on it.
Q. You wouldn't feel
form an opinion?
A.

Nosir."

~-o\\TS<'1f

qualified to
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This is the famous gentle!llan ah;o who was personally in charge of and partieipated in the famous snrve~
which was thrown out by the court for inaccuracy heeausc tlw transit man took a shot which would have required seeing ReV<'ll feet under groumL
Connsel for plaintiff would now :state that the opiil1011 of Mr_ Goodrich, ehief engineer of plaintiff, and of
Mr. Crocker, eminent mining engineer, shonld lw di.sregarded beeause, perchance, l\1 r. Earl thought there might
be some questiou with refereuee to iL
The only qnestiou ·which was l'ver raised with referellel' to t lw po:ssibil ity o I' ilw Utah Copper Company
eatching iL-; water upou its owu premises was tlw qm~s
tion of cost_ Mr_ Gooclrich thought it would cost eight or
ten t1ionsaud dol1ars and Mr. Cro<~ker thought it would
he 1ware1· fivt• thonsmHl dollars. UndouJbtcdly ·with this
Llepn•ssion on it conld be done for about a's much as the
bri<'fs ill this <'ase ha,-e l'Ost ou appeal.
We respedfully snlnnit to this court that it never
·was a questioll of cost. rrhey realizell that the Hays
~pring \Yaters we1·c· alread~· flowing upon defendant's'
premises and aln~ad:- had a substantial copper eonteut.
rl'IH~.'- wanted to obtain those waters, awl till'Y realized
ihat the:- eould not <lo sob:- eatching the dump water at
the toe of the dump hecanse the Hays Spring \Vaters
were there hufore the dnmp \Vas installed and ha<l a substantial t•oppl•r conte11t before the dump was installed.
Therefore, thu ouly wn~- to obtain the Hays ~priug with
its coppl'l" eoutc•Jlt was to obtain defendants' property.
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On page 116 of plaintiff's brief complaint seems to
be made thn t because M1·. Goodrich testified "at the
early stages of the ease" and admitted that jt would be
possible rww at comparatively 'small cost to collect the
eopper solutions from plaintiff's dump at the toe of that
dump and on the plaintiff's land, and because, as stated
on p. 117 of plaintiff's brief "the defendants' proposal
had not been maL1e at that time", some allowance ought
to be made for the testimony of Mr. Goodrich. This
soundt'l almost aR though the plaintiff were attempting to
impeaeh its O\Yn witness; but the fact nevertheless remains that Mr. Goodri-ch testified (Ab. 160, Tr. 384-5)
that a tunnel which "would divert all of the waters from
the Utah Copper dump" could be constructed for "eight
or tEm thousand dollars''. And there can be no dispute
that Mr. Goodrich, whose eminence and authority as an
engineer needs no testimonial, answered the following
question with the following words (Alb. 160, Tr. 385):

"Q. But for eight or ten thousand dollart'\
you ean produee such a catchment and receive tlw
waters for the Utah Copper Company 1
A.

I should say so. ''
COSTS

'Phe eourt elTe(1 in awarding costs to plaintiff. Plain-tiff contends that the court did not err in awar(1ing costs
to plaiutiff heeause defendant perverted a true condemuatiou action iu to an action to try title. In bring-ing
this action plaintiff must be held to have brought before
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the court all the iswes whi~!J tlw la\\' provides must be
determined before the plaintiff is entitled to succeed.
Sub-paragraph 1 of Section 7333, Compiled Laws of Utah
1917, provides :

"OONDlTIONS PRECEDJ!~N'l' TO CONDEMNNTION. Before property can be taken it
must ,appear:
"1. T!Jat the use to which it ts applied ts a
use authori?.(Kl h~· law;''

'l'hat tlw nst> to which the tn1ds soug·ht to be• conde1nned
in tl1is adion was sneh a use was neeessarily in the ease,
and the lmrden on this issue \\·as on the plaintiff. It
hurd!~· lies in the mouth of the plaintiff to complain
reg·ar<ling this matter.
~\n action in <·ondemuation ts a. dnurti<' one.
[t lllnules compulsoril.\· the rights of tlw citi?.Cll in the mtt>rc>st of the larger \\'l'lfan•. 'rhe existPuce of a sitnatiml wananting the applieatiou of rig·hts of e111inent domain should he cstablishPd he.YO!Hl all question or thl'
right hceomes a \\TOllg', and its exercise au arbitrury and
mwonstitutional abuse. '!'here is no hardship in requiring that the plaintiff i11 an adiou in <·onclemnation be
required to pa,v that small portion of tlw eosts permitted
to lw taxed in litig:ation of great expense and of vital
jmportanee. Certainly the wclfarP of the (•omnmnit~~
m](l the interest of the pnblie at large will he best served
by making: the condemnor pay the taxahiP c-ourt (~osts
of every c.ondernnation snit the defense of which is
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conduetl•d in good faith. The plaintiff gets the benefit
of a drastic remedy. He certainly should comply with
the constitutional provision that private property may
not he taken without full compensation.
It developed \'er:r early in the adion that the defendant eontenderl that the plaintiff was not eondemning land
hut was acquiring the title to the defendants' eopper
solutions. 'rhis was an entirely legitimate, proper and
ueeessary eontention. Of course, the plaintiff would have
preferred that the defendnnt lie down on the only real
issue in the ease and snlnnit, as it has repeatedly suggested in its brief, to the plaintiff's unobstructed progress; hut the defendant dirlnot care, and the law did not
require it, to do this; and it does not lie in the mouth of
the plaintiff to eomplai11 that this wa:,; not done. The
TJlaintiff cannot say, "It is trne, we hrought an action
in eondenmntion hut ~'ou claimed. it was in fad an aetion
to acquire title and therefore we do not have to pay the
costs of a eondemnation adion." Plaintiff's mouth is
closed as far as this defr~liSl' i::; COlH'Cnwrl.

On page 12:3 plaintiff says: ''The costs taxed were
not incurred in ascurtainiug- tlw amount of the compensation to which the owner was entitled by reason of the
taking;" etr-. True. The main question in this case is
whether or not the plaintiff is by this action taking the
r~efundauts' copper solutious. 'l'he land itself without the
solutions is of comparatively little value. But the questiou of whether the plaintiff was taking the defendants'
solutions bei11g the important question in the r·nsc, and
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it being ueem;~ary for the plaintiff to succeed on this
issue, ami thi~ being an appropriate issue in eoudemnation action, tlte plaintiff ~hould, however the action may
result, pay the costs of this action. Plaintiff has an
idea that if plni11tiff is successful in a eondenmatiou ~uit
that the fad of success relieves plaintiff from paying
eosts. Of <~ourse suc·h is not the ease.
'l'hat the question of title~ is entirely appropriate m
('Ondemnation suits is <lec·hued by our ow11 eourt in the
ease of K'etchum Coal Co. v. District Court, 159 Pae. 7iJ7,
in which the old fi.rm of Dickson, Ellis, Ellis & Schulder
represented certain of the partie:,; and contended unsuc·c·e~sfully that the issue of title ought to 'be settled outside of <·ondemuation suits. After referring to a New
York ease, where, under the statute "eoudemna tion proceedings are special and the proceeding comes before
courts of geueral jurisdiction only in case when there
is an appeal from the damages awarded to the land
owner", the court says:
"Under such circumstances every lawyer
readily understall'ds aud appreeiates why condenmation proceedings are not deemed proper
to try questions of title, and therefore such questions must he tried iu a court of general jurisdiction, and in case the dispute respecting the title
arises between the condemnor and the eondenmee
the question of title must be determined in a proper court before the damages can be adjusted as
between them.''
The court, after referring to the fact that m eertain

lOG
juritldictions it has been deeided that ditlputes as to title
between c;ondemnor and ('tmdemuee may he settled in condmnnation proceedings, and in other states the issue
as to title between cmzdemttees may not he
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tried, since

,-;uch iH.sue relate:-; only to a distrilmtiou of damages and
not to th(• right to eomlemn, the court says:
''Anwug othm· easm.; in whi(~h it is held that
disputes regarding the title to the condemned
proport~· may 1b(~ determined in the eondemnation
proceedings vvo refer to the following: Chicago
& M. J1Jl. Hy. Co. v. Diver, 21:~ Ill. 26, 72 N. E. 758;
Illinois Cent. H. Co. v. Roskemmer, 2fi4 Ill. 103,
105 N. K 695; Chic:ag-o & N. \Y. Ry. Co. v. Miller,
251 Ill. 58, 95 N. E. 1027; Wilcox v. ~t. P. & N. P.
Ry. Co., 35 Minn. 4i19, 29 N. vY. 148; Gerrard v.
Omaha, N. & B. H. R. Co., 14 Neh. 270, 1!5 N. \Y.
2:n; Dietrichs , .. LiTH·oln & N. W. H. Co., 14 Neib.
:l35, 15 N. \\'. 728; City of Los Angelos Y. Pomeroy,
124 Cal. 097, ;)7 Pae. 5Rf\. ''

T•~l.

Tlw eonrt tlwn discus:w.'-' tliP case• of Chit'ago & 11.
H~·. Co. , .. Diver, and then :-;trangPl~· I'Cfl'rs to the

"interPsti11g" ca:w of Los AngelPs "- l'mn(•ro~·,
lows:

<IS

fol-

"In City of Los Angeles \'. Pollleroy, supra,
Chief .Justice Beatty, unde1· a statute like
ours, in his nsual clear and vigorom; style, points
out that all questions relating to til(• title of the
property that is eondemned or is affected by the
c~ondemnation proceeding that llla)' arise should be
tried ami determi11ed in the eondemnation action.
Aml why may that not he done'? It seems t']ear
that our statute, whieh is likP the one in California, contemplates that it should be done. Comp.
~lr.
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Laws 1907, see.
provides:

:~596,

so far as material here,

" 'The court or judge thereof shall
have power: * * * To hear and determine
all adverse or conflicting claims to the
property sought to be condemned, and to
the damages therefor,' and 'to determine
the respective rights of different parties
seeking condemnation of tl1e same property.'
"Again, under our statute an action to condemn lands is conlnleiH·ed, eolHlneted, and tried
in the same eourts and in the same manner as all
other adions affecting real property are tried.
In view of the provisions of our statute it is not
easy to understand why all issues arising in eondeumation aetiont:; are not to he tried and determined in that action the same as is done in all
other actions affeeting real property.''

It is interesting to note that costs of the proceedings in the Ketchum ease were assessed against the
party contending that tlw issue of title was foreig·n to
a condemnation action, so the matter ought to be settled
in this jurisdidion.
The question of whether or not the attempted use of
the statutes of emineut domain is in fact a legal use, or,
as our statute puts it "that the use to whic·h it is to he
applied is a use authorized by law", is always a proper
1ssue. Our statute is the same as that of California.
In 10 Cal. .Jur., p. iW:l, Sec. 19, title "F~mineut Domain",
the text is as follows:
"Unquestionably the ow11er of the laud song·ht
to be condemned may show that the use and its
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purpose are private and not public. And it is
competent for the state, upon discovering the misuse of its authority whereby private property is
being wrongfully taken for private use, to interpo:c:P by its aitomey general to con·eet the abuse.
The reasoning underlying this rule is, of course,
that inasnnwh as the plaintiff in proceedings to
appropriate private property for puhlie use purports to act as ,agent for the state, it necessarily
follmvs that if tlw use is a mere private one the
proceeding·s amount to an imposition upon the
court before which they are had."

A m1mlwr of (•ase:-; arc <'itl•d in support of the text, but,
as it seellls to ns, tlH• proposition is too tnanifest to req ni re extensive (•i ta tion.
011 page 12;) plaintiff ('it<•s tlH• Colot·ado caf'e of
Haver, .. Slatonock, 7G Colo. :301, 223 Pa('. ~m-1-. As \\'l' read
I he ('aSl' it dom; not support plaintiff's eontention in any
n~sped.

In Colorado, as in U!ali, !liN(' an• ('l'l"tnin pn~
quc;;.;tions \Yhi('h lllllst he de(•ided hy the court
or by a ('Ollltllissioner heforp the question of damages
},., submitted to a jnr.Y. 'l'hP court holds, as \\"(' uncler::-;tand the Colorado decision, that if a part;' fails to
raise tlw pn~limitiar~· questiow.; lwforp tlw court, he
waives these qnes!ionH, and if lw later improperly injech;
them in the pro('eedings heforc the jlu~· be is not fmtitled
to his ('OHts in prese1Jting the issues after having by
his ('Ollduet waived them.
liminm·~-

A good explanation of tlH• Hituation as far as the
Colorado ca:-eH are ('Oncenwd will lw fonnd iu the ease
of l 'nion Pn('. Hy. Co. \'. Colornclo Postal, ()!) Pac. 564.

]O!J

\Yc <tuotc from pages 5()5 and

::J()~:

'' Uonuscl for respoudeut contend that these
seYeral matters present prejudicial error, for the
reason that petitioner had failed to prove that the
property sought to be c·ondemue<l was to he taken
for a public use, or that there was any uecessity
for taking iL It is also urged that, in view of the
issues ma(le by the pleadings, the respondent had
the right to introduce at the hearing before the
commissioners the testimony refused, for the reason that such testimony tended to establish a state
of faets from whieh it woulcl appear the taking of
the land in question was for a private, and not a
public·, use, and that there \Vas no necessity for
sueh taking. These matters might well be disvosed of upmt the ground that the law does not
c·outemplate that commissioners in condemnation
proecediugs shall ('Onsider or determine sueh
questions. On the contrary, they are to he determined hy the• ('Onrt or judge, bnt, unless so presented for detenninatiou before the appointment
of commissioners, or the right to do so is in some
\Ya~, reserved, t Itt'~' an• waived.
Recti on 1720, 1
Mills' Ann. St., provides that the court or judge
rna~, appoint a hoard of ('Ommissioners to aseertain the ncc·essity for taking lauds sought to he
condemned. \Yhat propoRitions may he raisecl
upon the question of IW<'essit? will vary aecording to the ein·tmtsblll('Cs of ea('h particular ease.
In this instance, however, so far as disclosed by
the pleadings, or any matter discussed in the
brief, we are of thP opinion that the authority of
the cmumi~simwrs on that question would be ·limited to a determination of the one of quantity of
land, or, more a<'curatel.\· speaking, tlw width of
the proposed right of way suffieient to serve thP
rcasonahle physical needs of petitioner in erecting
and maintaining its telegraph line. Or,dinarily,
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the authority of eommissionerH on the subject
is r,;o limited. In effect, this court has so decided
in the reeeut ease of Gibson v. Cann ( Oolo. Sup.)
66 Pac. 879. It was certainly never intended that
rommissioners should be required to determine
questions the solution of which depends upon the
application of intrieate questionr,; of law such as
would he presented by the trial of isr,;ues tendered
by the Hllswer of respondent. This <'OUrt has frequently decided, in cases where the question of
damages in eollllemna tion proceedings was submitted to a jury, that the only matter proper fm·
the jury to consider was the one of damages, and
that all other questions must he settled in limine.
Irrigation Co. V. navis, 17 Colo. 326, 29 Pac. 742;
Thompson v. Reservoir Co., 25 Colo. 243, 53 Pac.
507; Sicdler v. Seely, 8 Colo. App. 499, 46 Pae.
848; Colorado Fuel & Iron Co. v. Four Mile R.
Co., 29 Colo. ____ , 66 Pae. 902. On principle tho
same rule is applicable to the ease at bar. The
commissioners wore appointed without objection
on the part of respondent. There was no attempt
U'Pon its part to suhmit to the eourt the determination of any of the questions of fact upon which
it relied to (lcfeat the procediug until after the
report was filed. RJespomlent did not serk to
prove that petitioner did not require the quantity
of land sought to he condemned, nor by its pleading·s was any such defense suggested. None of
the matters a hove mentioned whieh respondent
sought to snhmit to the emnmissioners were of a
eharacter \dtieh it was the province of that body
to determine; ami by the eonrse pursued the right
to have them determined hy tho c-ourt was waived.
The reason for this coneh1~ion is obvious. If, for
any reason, tho petitioner in eoudemnation proeocdings i1-l not outitle(l to exorcise the right of
eminent domain, or take a particnla r tract, these
questions should be determined hy the court in
limine. If adverse to tho petitioner, that is the
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end of the pro<:eeding. irrigation Co. v. Davis,
supra. In thiR eonnection wu eall attention to
the case last cited. ln that ease the petitioner
sought to have a right of way condemned through
an already-existing diteh. It was held that, if the
responde11t desired to have the question of the
feasibility and praeticwbility of takiug a right of
way through such ditch detPrmined, the question
should have bet•H refuJT<>d to a hoard of eommissimwn..; appoiuted by tht' court, as the lnw directs.
This holding, howen~r, was based upon the provisions of sedions 22G1, 22G2, 1 Mills' Ann. St.,
whieh provide that lands improved or o<•cupied
shall not, without the written consent of the owner, be suhjel'ted to the 'burden of more thau one
irrigating ditch coustmeted for the purpose of
conveying ·water through such property to lands
adjoiuing or beyond, when the object ean be feasibl~· alHl practicably attained by unitiug and cmlveying all the water neeessary through such property in one diteh; and that, wlwre it is necessary
to c-onvey water for the purposes of irrigation
through th<' improved or o<'<'upied lands of another, t lw shortm.;t and mmd. direct route praeticabl<' npon wlliel! sucl1 diteh cm1 he constructed
shall he Releded. rrhese provisions, however, have
no application to the ease at 1bar. Neither were
the.v invoked in Gihson v. Cann, supra. Both
parties, lioweYer, appear to have treated the question of neeess,it_,. as raised by the pleadings and
teRtimony offered as heing proper to submit to
the commissioners, aud for that reason we shall
treat it as property presented for r<'YiC\Y."
\Yo also <'all nttentiou to tht• following additional
Colorado <·a:,;es:

Sand Creek Latt~ral Irrigation Co.,.. DaviR,
29 Pae. 742;
Lavelle v. Town of .Julesburg, 112 Pae. 774.
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In the ('ase of Denver Power & Irrigation Co. v.
Denver & H. G. R Co., G9 Pac. 568, our question is discussed at pages 571-2.
Without quoting at length, the court holds that a
dispute betn·ee,n the condemnees as to title is not a proper
defense because it in no way qualifies or affects the
right of the condemnor to take the property but only
e011eerns between whom the amount which the plaintiff
must pay shall be divi(1e(l. This limitation of the doctrine that a suit in eondemna tion may not he turned j nto
n suit to quiet title as between the eondemnces is perfectly intelligi,ble, and it is also understandable that an
ordinary suit to quiet title may not be pursued under
the guise of proceedings in eminent <1omain because such
proceedings imply an admission on the part of the condemnor that the condemnee is OWller of an interest which
the condemnor seeks to obtain by procec~dings in eminent
domain, otherwise the proceedings have no basis, but the
question of the extent on character of the title or ownership of the condemnee is always material and pertinent.
But, we respectfully suggest, the (pJCstion of 1\·hetlwr
or not the condemnor is not attempting under the guise
of eondenmaiiou to promote a private and not n publie
purpose, or the question of whether or not "the nse to
which it is to be applied is a use authorized by law", as
our statute phrases it, is always in the case. The
Colorado ease, to our min<l, is direc·tly in point on this
phase of our eontrovcrsy. The eourt .in the Colorado
ease says that as between two persons, both of whom
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desire to accomplish the public purpose, the courts will
not permit one to eondemn the land of another, otherwise there would be no end to eondenmation proceedings.
The court says :
"So far as the authority to t'xerciHe the right
of eminent domain for public uses is c·oncemed,
it is based npon the theory that the propert~
granted the subject is upou the eondition th:1t it
may he retaken to s·erve the neeessities of tlw
SO"\;ereign power (Mills, Em. Dom. Sec·. 1; n. S.
v. J Oll(~H, 1O:J U. S. 51:3, :~ Sup. Ct. :346, 27 L. Ed.
1015), and to this end agc•ucies neated h~v the
state, the purpose of which is to serve the public,
nw~- exercise this rigllt. vVberc, however, land
is already <levoted to a public use, it would he
wholly unreasonable to permit it to ho takeu for
another public· use whieh would nullify and det'oaL
the oue to which it is already devoted, exPept in
cnses w!Jere the overwhelming neeessities of the
public were sueh that, in order to serve their
nee<ls, or ~upply their neeessities, the taking of
:mch property became nec~essary.
Unles,; so
limited, no rule governing the rights of tho:'le
engaged in conducting a business for the benefit
of the public could be formulated which woul<l afford them protection against others desiring to
also engage in the transnc·tion of a puhlie business. \Vhile eorporations engaged in business of
a nature which requires them to serve the pulJli<~
are said to be public eorporations, they are, in
fad, hut r)l'ivate enterprises, inaugurated ror tlie
henefit of their stoekholders; and if one sueh c·orporation may take the property of another so a-;
to deprive the latter of the use to "\Yhic,ll it ic;
tlcvotccl, except public necessity demawls ~mcl1
taking, t1wre wonl<l be llO re:u:mwhle limit to the
eonditlollf; mHler wl1ich the power of omiHent
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domain might be exereised. vVithout tbe limitation sugg;ested, the most absurd results ('onld follow. 'l'he second might take from the first, others
take from the latter, and the first tum about and
retake, and thus the process go on ad infinitum.
Lalw ~~riP & W. R. Co. v. Hoard of Connnissioners, supra. The taking of property already
devoted to a pulblie USt' to an t'xteut which wholl~·
defeats snrh usc, for another public use, eannot
he justified when it would merely rt>snl! in a
ehangc of ownership, without iu an? mam!Pr tending !o meet or sf'ITP !lH• <>xigc•ueic~s of }lnhli<l
needs, o1· where tlw clu-mge of ownership \Yonld
lwconw a mer<> nwtt<'r of pri,·at<' couceru. Chicago
& N. W. H~·. Co. "· Chieago & ~~- R Co., 11:2 Ill.
5H9. in tlH' eir<'umstmH'<'S of this ca,.;c' lll'ithet·
<'Olllpnratin' <·onv<'lli<'nee. beneflts, nor <·os1 to th<>
n~spc<·tin' parties can h<> taken into eol!siderntioll."

In quoting from the ease' of Ilaver Y. "Iaioll(wk, at
pagt> 1:2;) of plaillti f'f's brief plaii!liff has olnitte<l what,
to ns, is 1h<> important pal'! of the decisio11 unde1· the
Colorado pmeeedings. \\' l' quotP from th<' <·ase eommeneing· at the ,.;(:'('OJJd eolunm, p. ~·l:\4:

"\\r e <·an no! hold that the question of neressity im·olvcs the question whetlwr then' is any
water in existen(•c whi(•h petitioners can usP. To
so hold would he to allow ·,the l'OIIIIlliHsioncrs,
whose :;;o]c function is to determine the necessitv
for the taking to dctenniuc questions of priority
of appropriations of water, and, in this ease, to
determiue the extent to which t lw :,;everal parties
eoncerned iu this proceeding may use \\'aters from
the ~1atonock spring· or an~· waters fonn<l in the
'Zorn arroyo', if such arroyo exists. It was not
the <lnty of th<' eommissioners, appoint<>d i11 t hi-;
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case, to pass upon such questions. Their duty,
under the order and the instruetions of the court,
was solely to determine the necessity of the plaintiffs' proposed ditch and pipe line for the intended
use; not whether the plaintiffs had any right to
the use intended, nor whether the intended use
could ever be consummated. The question of necessity does not involve the right to condemn, nor
whether plaintiffs could ever make use of the property sought to be oondemned if they obtained
it. The question of necessity simply involves the
necessity of having the property song!Jt to be
taken for the purpose intended.''

It ·will thm; he notieed that the conrt does not
hoh1 that if the proposed eondenmor had no water which
eonh1 lle used through the pipe line proposed to be laid
across the land of the eondemnee, sueh questiou would
not he proper in eondemnation proceeding·s, but that
sudt qne::;tion is not properly before the eommissioners
appointed by the court to determine the question of
"necessity"; "necessity simply involves the neeessity
of having the property sought to be taken for the purpose
intew1ed'' all(1 not the question of "'hether or not the
condemnor could use the right of way ::;ought to be coH<lemned. Certainly this question has no application in
our case. Here the question raised was whether or not
the "use" was one authori;,ed by law, ·whether under
the guise of c•ondeuming }and the plaintiff did not in faet
propose to engage in mining and take from the laud of
the plaintiff without paying for it the mineral valn<>s
therein contained.
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The ease of Oibson v. Cann, 66 Pac. 879, is referred
to in the Haver ease.

In that case the court held that

111 proceedings ''for the purpose of condemning a right
of way for a ditch and res·ervoir sites aeross and on the

land of appelleo" the court would noi inquire "whether
the enterprise is pradicablc or can be made a success
:fimmeially that these questions are not properly a matter
of legal neeessity; nor is it pQrtineut to inquire what
pet itimwr may he able to aceomplish in the way of obtaining \Yatl•r whieh ean be utilized through his proposed
d it ell and reservoir :-;ystem."

We Heed spend no time

on the distinction betwee11 the situation in thiR Colorado
ease and the ease now before the court. 'l'he question
raised by till• appell~mt in the• trial eourt wa,.; \Yiwthn or
not tilt> plaintiff" \\·as not asking tlw eonrt in pnmitting

1\w ust> of plai11tiff's lalJ(l un<ler the guise of a <'OlHlemnntion pro<'e<>ding to aequire the plaintiff's <'oppe>r solutions without

pa~'ing

for them.

The !laver ease> also n~fers to the <·asl~ of Schneider
, .. N<"hneidel·, HG Pac. :l47. The plaintiff sougltt to <·on<1l•mll a right of way for a dit<"h "extending from the
lower end of a

<'l~rtain

irrigation diteh upou defendant's

premises to plaintiff's premises." 1t was ohjectl'<l that
"the appropriatiou, wlwteve1· he the YolUine or origin
of the water, must attaeh directly or indircdly to some
natural COlHRl' or <"hannel."

'l'!Je court says, "He (the

<·ondenmee) <"mmot raise a question that does not conecru him or whieh rests solely hetweeu pctitiouers and
ot hur appropriators."

'l'he <"Ourt also

sa~·s:

''As to
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whether or not there is suffieie11t water for plaintiff's use,
ot· a~ to whether or not the plan is a pradieal or feasible
Ulll' i~ a matter which ('aunot be detennined in a pro<·eediug of this character." 'I' he eourt abo holds that
then~ is no merit to the C'outention "that no easement can
lw acquired for a diteh until the right to the use of the
water shall han• beeome vested." 1t seems to us quite
appnrcnt thai the situation in the em·w of Selllleirtcr Y.
S('lmeirler is Pntirely diffen•ut to that now before the
court. llt>rc tlw question was diredl)· within the proYi:->iou of tlw statuil' whieh pro\·ides that tlw eourt must
det<·nniue whether or not the "use" iuteuded is one
JH'rntitt<·d by law. 'l'lw real question in this case is
wlwther or not plaintiff under the guise of condemnation
is attl•Jupt iug to confiscate the mineral values helonf.,l'j_ng
to thl' defell(lant.
Plaiutiff cites the case of Publie Serviee Co. v. CHy
of Lov<'laud, 7~l Colo. 21G, 24G Pac. 498, on p. 127 of its
ln·ief. The City of Lon~land broug·ht an action to condPmn for puhlie purposes an eledri(' light plant belonging
to tlw Public Serviee Compmt~·. The C'ourt held in that
ease that the <pwstiou "eouceruing the clain1 that there
wns a misappropriation or improper diversion of public
funds h~, c·ity officers" was not proper, and that the emim•nt domain rnocl'edings could not be eonverted "into
n trial for alleged misfeasan<·e or malfeasance of muniC'i pa 1 oftiee n; ''. 'l'hese remarks eoneern an attempt lly
the Plcctric light plant owner to dcfewl against the eondenmation prof'eedingR on the ground that the funds
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for the purehasc and those for eonsiruction of the electric
light plant should be kept separate, which it was elaimed
was not clone. '!'he court holds that such an issue is improper, <'iting, among others, the ease of Shields v. City
of Lo\'claud, in whieh it was held that "questions of
municipal bonds and the rights of holders thereof" could
not lw injected into a condemnation case, among other
reasons, bee· a use "such parties are not before the court.'~
\\' e C'annot sec how these manifestly foreign considerations a l"e in any \\·ay analogous to the issue in the present
case as to whether or not the plaintiff is not in allegedly
attempting to condemn a right of way actually appropriating, without paying for it, eoppcr solutions of the
defendant.
On page 127 of its brief plaintiff cites Truckee River
General Eleetric Co. v. Durham, :~8 Nev. :311, 149 Pac.
til. In this case the court holds: "If the llemand is
so unreasonable as to justify a fair-minded person in
litigating the question, small C'onsider·ation should he paid
to his request for judgment for the costs whieh accrued
after the filing of the answer in the case." And then a
sentence follows in the opinion which shows that the
statement of the eourt is purely dieta. This sentence is
omi tte<l from tho quota i ion by appellant: "Sinee the
case must be tried anew, we will make no order as to
C'osts." \\' e know nothing about the statutes in Nevada
relating to costs in condemnation suits, but in any event,
we are perfectly willing that the eourt shall consider
whether or not the defense made in this case is "so un-
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n•n:-;mwhlL''' tlJat it will shoek a fair-milldecl person, an<l
to dutermine our right to costs from such consideration.
page 128 eounsel reiterates its assertion that in
ihis adion the defenJauts have settled a fictitious daim
for damages in the sum of $200,000.00 and upwards for
$500.00, the amount offered prior to the institution of the
suit. ~We have heretofore discussed this eharge and shall
content ourselvL•s witlt J'L•ferring tilL• court to page 17
or this ))riel' where tlw matter is considered.
< h1

1:l0 l'()SJHHHlL•Jlt eiteH the ca:-;e of ln re Coul'!land, ete. Horse Railway Co., 98 N. Y. 36:~. (The page
eitation is iu error. It is found at page 336). This castl
i:-; cited on tlte proposition that costs nmy be awarded
L•itliL•r the JllaiutiiT or the Llefendaut under the New York
statutL·s appli<·able to speeial proceedings. The case is
mw in \Yhi<·ll a railroad coJllpany attempt;, to condemn '1
no:-;sing o\·er tlJL' track of another company. Respondent
in Lluoting the Ll<·eisiou of the eourt 011 page 1:n leaves
OUt tJH' lllOHt llllportant part. rJ'his part distinguishes
Ou

}JHg'l'

tht• L'HSL' eited from the presunt one. ll1 the pre:,.;eut case
an• contesting tlw right of the plaintiff to condemn.
In tilL• <·ase eitL•d Uw right to eoudt•mn is admitted and
tliL· onl:· <pll'~lion was as to the necessity of taking a
particular pie(·e of laud, awl tllis question was to be de-

•n·

tt>rmiued by commissioners under the 1\ew York practiee
in ~ueh lllatters. 'l'his ease holds that the matter of one
rairoad crossing another is g·overned by a special statute
awl, as is said in several other New York cases, such au
nction is not strietly a proceeding in eminent domain.
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On the latter point we cite the following cases:
In re Limi & H. :F'. Ry. Co., 22 N. Y. S. 967;
Buffalo B. & L. R. Co. v. New York L. E. &
vV. R. Go., et al., 25 N. Y. S. 265;
!Hornellsville Elec. R. R. Co. v. N. Y. L. E.
& Vv. R. Co., 31 N. Y. S. 745.
We also wish to refer to the case of New York \Vest
Shore & Buffalo Ry. Co., In re Walsh, 94 N.Y. 287. We
quote from pp. 2~)4- and 295, as follows:
''In the present case tho costs allowed are
small compared with the amount of the award,
which was $35,500, but that can make no difference
in the principle. If the company can recover
against the land-owner the expenses of proceedings carried on by it for its O\Vn benefit, where the
avvarrl is large, it may do the same when the
award is small; and a case may he supposed where
the costs and expenses of the company would absorb a large part, or even the \\'hole of the award.
There is no warrant in the Htatute for awarding
such eosts, and if there wel'e, it \Yould be a violation of tho ronstitutional right of the landowner.''
As further ovidonee that nos sing eases in Now York
are treated as sni generis, we eall attention to the fact
that the \\Talsh ease is referred to in tho Courtland case.
\\"e do not believe that there is any rem;on in the attempted distinction made by eounsel between the two
eases. It is not the law that the land owner is only entitled to his costs in the action for determination of damages aud is denied his eosts in an action whore he resists
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the right of the plaintiff to condemn. An eminent domain
proceeding is logically divided into three parts: (1) The
determination of the right to condemn. Under this part,
questions of public use, the authority of the plaintiff
and conditions precedent to the exercise of the right are
properly involved. (2) Necessity. Under this part questions of the need of a particular track or method of
accomplishing a particular result are to be considered.
(3) 'rhe question of damages. It should not be the law,
and it is not the law, that the land owner can recover
his costs expended under the last heading only.
Cases holding that the land owner can recover his
costs expended in denying the right of the plaintiff td
condemn are the following:
San Joaquin & Kings River Canal & Irr. Co.
Inc. v .•James .T. Stevinson, et al., 1:32
Pac. 1021;
Yolo vVater & Power Co. v. Edmunds, 205
Pac. 445.
Respomlent further eites two cases holding that the
condemning party may be allowed his costs on appeal
when the property mvner appeals. vV e are appealing
from the deeision of the lower eourt ,:~;hich awarded the
costs of the trial to the plaintiff, and up to the present
time we have no quarrel with the rules of law enunciated
in the eases cited by respondent on page 1:32 of its brief;
in fad, the prononneements of the California eourt in
the ease of City of Oakland v. Paeific Coast Lumber &
~till Co., 172 Cal. :132, 15G Pac. 4G8, as to costs on the
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trial meet with our entire approval.

'rhe court in that

<·ase reeognizes aud enunciate-s our position on the matter of costs ~u; clearly as it may he done. We quote from
p. 4()!) as follows:

"1t is seUlt~d law in this state that, in view
of the provision of Rection 14 of article 1 of our
Constitution that 'private property shall not be
taken or damag-e<l for public use \vithont .iust eompensation having- iirst lwen ma<le to, or paid into
court for, Uw owner,' the owner whose property
is thus soug-ht to lw takeu <·aunot he required to
pay any portiou of' his I·easoiwhle costs neeessarily i1H•itlcntal to the h·inl of' the isstws 011 his part,
OJ' any part of the ('Osts of the plaintiff; for to requin) him to do thiR would redm•e the just compensation awarded by the .inr.'· by a snm equal to
that paid by him for such eosts. 'l'his was helrl
to he the ndc as to the cosh; in the SUJH'rior cour·t
in the ease of San Francisco v. Collins et al., 98
Cal. 259, :~;~ Pae. 56, vvhere til<• trial eourt, following tlw provisions or :,;ection 125:-i of the Code
of Civil Procerlurc, had apportioned sneh co:,;b
between the partie:,; on adverse sides. Said seetion 12;)5, speeially applicahlt• to aetions in eminent flomain, provi<l0d, as it still provi(l<'s, that:
" 'Costs ma~' be allow0(l OJ' not, awl,
if allowed, may lw apportioned between
the partie:,; on the sallie OJ' adn'l'."il' sidt':',
i11 the di:,;crctioll of the court.'

"lt was heltl that thi:,; secti011 was limited in
its effed by the provision of :,;cdion 14 of arti(~lt~
1 of the Constitution, hereinbefore :,;d forth, and
the order of the superior eonrt was l'lW<'I'S!'cl. It
iR not questioned that this ruling was iu aeeonl
with tlw decit-~ions in other states, an(1 its correct-
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ness has never been doubteu. In San Joaquin
& Kings River, etc., Co. v. Stevinson, 165 Cal.
540, 132 Pae. 1021, it •vas held that on a successful appeal by the party seeking to condemn, the
judgment in favor of the owner being reversed,
the constitutional provision precluded the recovery by the party seeking to condemn of itf; costs
of appeal. 'rhis ruling was in aeeord with the
overwhelming weight of authority in other jurisdictions, and we see no reason to uoubt its correctness.''
The other case eited by respondent on page 1:32 of
its brief is i'rom the State of Washington, and sinee
submitting our brief" on this <tuestiou the ('ase of
State v. Superior Court of Walla "Walla County wa,s
decide<l h~· the Supreme Court of \Vashington. The report of t l1is <'ase may he found in 9 Pac. (2d) 70. We
quote from p. 71 as follows:

"Onr Constitutio11, art. 1, sec. 16, prescribes
that no private property shall he taken or damaged for pnblir or private use without just compensation having hee11 first made or paid into
court for the owner. Under this provision of the
Constitution it has heen held from an early day
that the land-owner must not be put to the expeuse of litigation in order to preserve his constitutional right to have the nmount of damages
<1etermined by a court in a proceeding to which
he is a party. Adams Oounty v. Dobschlag, 19
Wash. :156, 53 P. :1:~9; Little v. King County, 159
\Yash. 326, 293 P. 438.''
Se<~

therein.

also Kelle1· v. Miller 165 Pae. 774 and ('ases cited
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011 page 129 counsel say.-;: •' Determination of title
to the eoppcr solutions was not a neecssary ineident of
thir-; suit~-no more so than all inquiry into the precis·:;
nature of plaintiff's title in or to its dumps in Dixon
Gnleh, nor into the many other matters the eourts have
excluded from consideration in condeumation suits." If
the only question at issue ill this ease had beeu the title
of plaintiff to plaintiff's dumps in Dixon Guleh, there
would ltm·e he ell no Ia w suit.

\ \" n

aJ·p

not ('Oncerned iu

<HJ.v way with thai title. 'rllis action, however, did eoucem c·crtaiu c·opper solutions not in plai-ntiff"s rlump
but on the pn'mises of the defendant, and the whole question is whether or not, beeausp plaintiff owns ('ertain
dumps west of Tract D it also owns ('Crtain ('Opper r-;olutions appearing in Tract D. Certain!~· il' the copper
solntions are owned hy tl1c defendants, the plaintiff had
no right to condemn Tra(·t D and eaptu1·e thesp copper
solutions. 'l'he purpose of this adiou was to (·apture
eoppcr solutions on Tra(·t D, and all the ist>ues raiHed
lnwe hee11 di rpeted to the IJUestion of wht>tber or not
this was a "use" of Tract D sue h as is '• aut hori ~eel by
law". Thai issue is cxprt-ssly made mw of the pl'Pliminary ones before the cmut in f·ondt-mnation proc·eedings.
N ont- of tho caHes cited on page ] 2D by plaintiff in whicl1
the conrts han; exclnded extraneous issuer-; from proeoediugs in eminent domain haYP thp n•motest resemblance to the issues in this ease.
'l'he ('aRe of lure City of Cedar Rapids, 83 lo\Ya, 39,
01 N. \\~. 1142, is a ease where the owner of property

attempted to set up the fact that the eity had 110 funds
with \\·hieh to pay for the land taken. It was held that
tllis questio11 did not affect the Cit~· 's r·ight to bring
the action because payment in full would have to be
made before the City could take the property.
Tlw caSl' of M ereer Count_,. , .. \Y oHf, :n/ lll. 74-, KG
X. K 70K, is a similar casC' in whi(•h it is ht>lcl that
whether or not a cou11ty has sufficient money to build a
jail is not a proper math)r to be <'Ollsiderecl in condemllation proeeeclings.
Tlw 1wxt <·ase <·ited h.Y respondent is the cast~ of City
of Chi<·ago , .. The Hmritar.'· Dist riet of ( 'bieago, 272 lll.
:)7, 111 :\. !<:. 4!Jl. 'rhis was an aetimr b.v thP City to
<·mrdenm nrr outlet for a se,,·er. 'fhe def,ense was that
the liiOIH).'. for tlw eondPmllation action "·as furniRhecl
not h.'· the Cit_,. hut b.'· tl!e Union Htation Company. It
was lwld that this c·otdd not affect the City's rig·ht to
eon<lenm since tlwn' was a contra<·t bdwee11 the Cit~· and
the Fnion Rtation Compan.'· wht'rt>hy tlw Cit.'· had agreed
to ac<'omplish the changes whirh were sought in the action if the.'· were fonud to lle He<•essary.
In the Cit~· of Dallas , .. Halloek, 44 Ore. 246, l:i Pac.
20+, the objection Taise(l was that tht> Cit~· after pureha:sing the l)]'OJWJ't)r intendt>cl to pay the bnildeT by
making it a lPsRee of the \\·aten\'Ol'ks to he eonstnwted on
the land comlcmmecl and allowing the builder as such
lessee to eollect tolls fol' a term of years. It was held
that this was no objection to the action heeause the de-
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fendant was neither a resident nor a taxpayer of the
Uity and certainly did not affect the City's right to
condemn.
Similarly, m the ease of State ex reJ. Thomas, v.
Superior Court of Whatcom County, 42 Wash. 521, 85
Pac. :236, the owner of the property sought to defeat
the <'OIHlenmation action by pleading that the City had
exeeeded it~ right to incur debts. This was held to be
110 defense to a condemnation action.
ln the case of Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co.
v. Birmingham So. R. Co., 128 Ala. 526, 29 So.
4il5, the ow11cr of the land sought to defeat the right to
<'OIHlenmation on the ground that the railroad company
whieh was attempting to obtain ground for a branch road
had not filed a resolution of its board of directors with

the se<~retary of state authori%ing· it to do so. It was
held that this was only a matter of importance to the
stockholders of the t•orporation and of no legitimate eoncern to strang·ers.
City of Santa Ana v. Brunner, 1:32 Cal. 2:34, 64 Pac.
:287. rrhe objediou raised in this case was that one of
the trustees of the City had filed the petition which was
presented to the board requesting eondemnation of the
laud for eoustruction of an alley. It was held that this
objedion could not defeat the plaintiff's right of action
so long as there was a quorum without that trustee.
Hichland S('hool rrp. of Fulton County v. Overmyer,
164 Ind. ~~82, 7i3 N. E. 811, is a case where the objection
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to the right to condemn was that land was going to be
applied to a different use than that for \\'hich the action
\\·as <·ommenccd, and also that a loss quantity of land
·woul<l he sunieicnt or that another location would be more
<·onvt~uient. It was held that these objection:,; could not
defeat the rig·ht to ('OIHlenm.
The eourt sa:vs:

"It was not conqwtt~nt in this p1·ocet>ding to
iutroduce evidence tending to show that the property was to be applied to a <liffen~nt use than !lwt
for which it was appropriated. The propcrt~·
thus acquired could only be used for the public
purpose for whi(•h it was obtained under this
statute."
Kan::-;ns & 'l'Pxa::-; Coal Ry. Co. \'. Northwe::-;tern Coal
& M i niug Co., 1Gl l\l o. 288, 61 R. \\'. 684, 84 Am. Rt. Rep.
717,51 L. R. A. ~)i~(i, was a <"ase where the chief objection
;nts that a railroad was seeking· to lmild a branch Jine
for th<:> sole purpose of developing coal lauds owued by
the railroad. The court held the use was public beeanse
tht• railroad <"ould be required to cany passengers or
freigl1t for nnyolle desiring to nse it.
Caretta

R~·.

Co. v. Ya.-Po<"ahontas Coal Co., 6:2 \\T.
Va. 185, 57 S. E. 402, is a ease where the owner sought
to deft>at the right of a railroad eomp;m~· to <·omlerrm
land on tlw grouud that the p1·oposed route was through
a mountajnous and sparsely settled cou11tr.'' and that
only a few people would he able to use the road for the
purpose of transporting freight or for passenger ser-
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vwe. This was held to be immaterial on the question of
the right to eondemn.

It will be seen that while all the cases cited by the
respondent held that the questions attempted to be raised
were not competent and were not determinative of the
right to condemn, that none of the questions attempted
to he raised are analogous to the question in this case.
At any ra tl~, plaintiff allowed the question of title to be
raised in this action and without obj.ection, and admitted
that if the waters on Tract D had been found to belong
to the defemlant that this action wonld have been dismissed (Respondent's brief, p. 8) (Ab. ______ ), and also
plaintiff has stated that it could not in this action condemn any of defendant's waters, and further that it was
not attempting to do so.
CONCLUSION

In this case plaintiff is attempting to lift itself by
its boot straps. The only argument made by plaintiff
as to its right to collect water in catchment C is that it
i•s given such right hy the order of occupaney on June
13, 1928. Nothing antecet1ent, nothing other than this
order, is suggested as the basis of plaintiff's right; in
other words, the order which is part of these proceedings, the issuance of which and all right•s under the same,
the order that is brought hefore this court on this appeal; the determination of the effeet of which is the very
purpose of the appeal, is the only consideration on whieh
plaintiff staHds in au effort to uphold that order and the
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proceedings based thereon. This order was made "without prejudice" and only "pending the action", and has
no legal effieaey in (•onferring any affirmative rights on
the plaintiff. The plaintiff asserts that the order of occupancy gives it its right to capture copper solutions in
eatchment C. rrhis could only be true if the order could
not be appealed from. If it were final and once having
been entered could not be reviewed, plaintiff's position
might be eol'Tect, but the order i-s reviewable aml plaintiff is accountable for its oeeupaney, and whether or not
plaintiff obtains any right by the order is the very subject of this appeal. 'rhe order entered was "without
prejudice" to existing rights, conveyed nothing, granted
nothing·, wm; temporal')', was to be iu foree ouly until the
righb-; existing prior to the order itself could be determined. The whole purpo•se of an order of occupancy
pending the action is to preserve the status quo of the
partil's until fimd determination of their rights and, in
the 1neantime, at the peril of the condemnor, to permit
eondemnor to proeeed aeeonling to his claim of rig·ht.
The order, however, confers no rights and extends no
immunity. rrhe occupant cannot he charged with being
a trespasser, hut he must re•spoll(l for every element of
damage done hy him while in possession. The condemuee <~an lose nothing by the order.
Plaintiff lays great store upon the fact that the late
Honorable M'Orris L. Ritchi·e commeneed the trial of this
aetion and passe<l upon a motion for a nonsuit. We have
no desire to rob plaintiff of any weight to be attached to
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this fad; but considering- tlw sorwusnt>ss of the issues
involved here, both as to questions of law and as to tlw
amount of damage, it may be that the overruling of a
motion for a 11onsuit in t:he midst of a trial is not entitled
to very great weight. The case war-; nevm· completed bPfore .Jndge Ritchie and he never had an opportunity of
passing finally upon its merits. As to the adion by his
Honor, .Judg·c McDonough, we de,sire only to say that
it took .J uclge l\lcDonough a long time to reach a decision
in this matter, and does not indicate any case in arriving at the conclusion finally reached.
UNLESS PEltMITTED TO CONDEMN DEFENDANT'S PROPERTY
PLAINTIFF WILL HAVE "ABANDONFm"
THE COPPER SOLUTIONS.

On page 1:3;: plaintiff admits that "PlaiiJtiff's colldemnation sought by this ac·tion'' is for the purpose ''to
avoid ~· :; .,. au abandonment". In other worcls, before
the condemnation proC'eedings plaintiff realized it had
lost sueh copper solutions as ('.arne from its dump and
title to such copper solutions passed up011 reaching tlll'
we::-;tern boundary of t.ht> appellant's land to tlw appellant, othPnvise wh~· those proceedings. The purpose
of this action is to prevent •such an abandomne11t by acquirillg defendants' property. 'rhP won! "abandonment", as we han• heretofort> arg-ued regarding- thP
words "eonve~'", "c·arry", "transport", is a dangerous
word. Jt implies volition where no volition t•xists. It
is one of the charncteristies of water that tit!<> is lost
1
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without volition on the part of one having such title as
may he bad to water. In this case the plaintiff can acquire title only by collecting its copper solutions on its
property; it has no title at any other place. It does not
"abandon" title except in the sense that it loses title
when the waters pass from plaintiff's property, and defendant does not ''acquire'' title as far as any volitio11
on the part of appellant is concerned wheu the waters
pass across the western boundary line of appellant's
premises. The only change as far as the water is concerned is that while on the plaintiff's property the plaintiff has the right to capture and control the waters and
when the waters reach the defendant ',s property the defendant has an equal right. The right to capture foreign
waters whi(·h will come onto the defendant's laud is a
present right to future enjoyment. This right is tlll existing, t'Olltinuing right. It may not be acquired by plaintiff without the eonsent of the defendant. vV e know of
no provision of the statutes of condemnatiou which would
permit the plaintiff in this ca,se to acquire now without
compensation the copper waters which have come upon
the land of the defendant nor the present right of the defendant to such waters as may in the future come into
the land of defendant from whatever source they ma~·
come.
Plaintiff also says, on p. 133 of its brief: "If plaintiff be permitted to condemn, plaintiff's solutions will be
saved to plaintiff, not abandoned by it. In their effort
to defeat the eondemnation and thereby accomplish the
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a;bamlonment defendants require, defendants assume the
ahandonrnent the maintenance of this snit will avoid,
a false assumption upon wliich defendant's attempt to
Prect a defense." If plaintiff will liste11 with plaintiff's
n•asoninp; faculties after reading- again the foregoing,
plaintiff may hear with unmistakable viviclneRs tlw fa.ll
of the unRubstantial leg-nl •Rtructurc

attempted to be

erected by the plaintiff. In otlwr wonls, plaintiff admit"'
that if it were uot for thest~ pro<·cPdings, all waters eoming from till• plaintitT'R dnmp would now lw ahmHloncd
as aTI waterR prior to the order of oecupancy "pendinp;
the adion" and "without prejudicl•'' had hcl•n almn01wd,
and admits that it was the paHHing of the watt>rs onto
the premiRes sought to lw eondemued that <·oustitutcd
their abandonment by plaintiff and the acqnin~ment of
title h:· thl' defPndant. Plaintiff has also Hdmittt>d n•pcatedly in itR brief that plaintiff C'<lll acquire no watN
hy thiR aetiou, title to whi<·h iR in the defl'udmd. 'fht>
waters ~still cross the western houmlar.\· of thl• land o"·npd
hy the defendant and will f•outinue so to do iu all likl•lihood for many yt>arR to coml'. Tlw decrel' of no ('Ourt
<·an Atop their comiug, and as ineYitahly as the:· conw
the la\\· pronounees upon them the ownership of the defendant.

This ownership the plaintiff emlllot all<l dt>-

elarcs it doeR not seek to acquirl'. All plaintiff on its ow11
admiRsiou attempts to do by this adion is to prevcut au
"abandonment".

ThiR plaiutiif eanuot do.

No law of

condemnatim1 t•an repeal thP law of gravitation, or that
fundamental prineiplt> of the law of property all<l water,
that water, hceanRe of it1s migratory charaet<•r, must he
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captured in the laud belonging to the plaintiff befor·e it
belongs to plaintiff in any final sense; that when it leaves
the land of the plaintiff, plaintiff camwt fo1low it for tlte
simple reason that it would, in attempting to follow it,
be seeking not its own but that which belongs to another.
BY THE ORDER OF OCCUPANCY "PLAINTII:<'F'S BOUNDARY
LINE WAS, PENDING THE ACTION, EXTENDED
ACROSS TRACT D TO AND INCLUDING
PLAINTIFF'S INTAKE".

Plaintiff says: "Pending the action the copper solutioll's have been saved from abandonmen1t by order of
<'Ourt putting plaintiff iu possession for the purpose of
conveying plaiHtiff's eopper solutions across rrraet D to
aiHl into plaintiff's intake, by which order plaintiff';-;
boundary line was, pending the action, extended across
rrract D to and ineluding plainltiff's intake.'' vVe recall
someone saying, we think it was a United Rtates senator,
that it was the iHte11tiou of our country to pick up the
boundary line behY<:>en the Republic of Mexico and the
United States aud carry th.at boundar~· far into the heart
of' Mexico. It was a rather boastful declaration; but
nations are powerful and bouudar~· liues are subject to
strange movements wlw11 appeal is made to a jurisdietion in which there are few laws amino <'our·ts and ·where
the final arbiter is the sword and the only law is that
written by force. We '"·owler if the plaintiff feels that
it is aho•ve law and by its uucontrolled will eapahle of
twisting both law and justiee to the acc-omplishment of
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the movmg of the houndary that on .June 12, 1928, separated the appellant from those who owned the land
immediately to appellant's west.

"\Ve are quite sure,

nnless that was aocomplished in law and fact which
plaintiff says was a.cC'omplisbed,
boundary line

\nt::>,

to-w~t,

"plaintiff's

pending the action, Pxtended across

Tract D to awl including phintiff's intake", plaintiff
bas no hope of success in this action.

Did the order of

.June 13, 1928, entered "without prejudice" and only
"pending the action", pick up the westt boundary line
of the defendant's property and twist it into the contortions of Traet<s A, B, C, and D?

No.

The law, out

of its desire to promote certain general interests of the
community, has authorized the taking of property helonging to a private individual for certain public uses
and until all issues raised as to whether or not an alleged effort to apply ·such law is one which in fact comes
witthin the statute, permits the party claiming the benefit of the operation of the law to go into possession; but
just as certainly as the party claiming to be within the
provision of the law ha:,; the right, before all issuers involved in an attempt to apply the law have been determined, to enter into possession, such temporary occupant
must render an account of his acts while in possession,
if it is finally found that it was mistaken in claiming it
\\ias right in the institution of the proceeding. If, pending the action, the plaintiff could by the institution of
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proceedings to condemn the land of the appellant acqmre those lands for collecting copper water, and the
court in deciding later that the appellant

wa~s

wrong

could not compel the appellant to account for its actions
during its oecupane,v, all plaintiff would have to do would
he on the day of the decision in the present case that tlw
plaintiff was wrong in the im;!tituiiou of its suit in .June,
E)2~,

to refile another action, put up a bond "without

prejudice'', ''pending the adion '', and reoccupy the
premises of the defendant, and when defeated in a seeond

~suit,

commenee a thir·d suit, and continue on through-

out all time colleding the eopper solutions belonging to
the defell(lant. Or it may lw that the real imp01't of
plaintiff's words is even stronger than the foregoing. If
plaintiff is right, all plaintiff would have to do on the
trial of an aetiou .in <·ondemnation would be to prove
that au order had lwen entered" peudiug the action" and
''without prejudicP '' awl the trial would be stopped,
judgment pronounced for tlte plaintiff, and everybody
\\·ould take their hats :mel go home.

There would be no

danger in putting up a bond, according to plaintiff's
theory, because t,here would be no duty to account. The
bond \Vould be one of those amusing .incident's of the
proeeedings which enlivens the eouduct of a trial as
portrayed in Jig-hi opera. \;v'e are quite certain that all
the twisting of <the boundary by the order of oecupaney
"pending the action" an<1 "without prejudiee", entered
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on .J nne 13, 1928, occurred in that part of the anatomy
of counsel for plaintiff which is usually thought to be
devoted to the pr·ocesses of reasoning, and ha•s no other
existence.
Respectfully sUibmitted,
BADGER, RICH & RIOH, and
OARIJ)S J. BADGER and
H. D. LOWRY,

Attorneys for Defendants
and Appellants.

